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Abstract	  
	  This	  paper	  takes	  James	  David	  Forbes’	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  entry,	  
Dissertation	  Sixth,	  as	  a	  lens	  to	  examine	  physics	  as	  a	  cognitive,	  practical,	  and	  social,	  enterprise.	  Forbes	  wrote	  this	  survey	  of	  eighteenth-­‐	  and	  nineteenth-­‐century	  mathematical	  and	  physical	  sciences,	  in	  1852-­‐6,	  when	  British	  “physics”	  was	  at	  a	  pivotal	  point	  in	  its	  history,	  situated	  between	  a	  discipline	  identified	  by	  its	  mathematical	  methods	  –	  originating	  in	  France	  -­‐	  and	  one	  identified	  by	  its	  university	  laboratory	  institutions.	  Contemporary	  encyclopaedias	  provided	  a	  nexus	  for	  publishers,	  the	  book	  trade,	  readers,	  and	  men	  of	  science,	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  physics	  as	  a	  field.	  Forbes	  was	  both	  a	  witness,	  whose	  account	  of	  the	  progress	  of	  physics	  or	  natural	  philosophy	  can	  be	  explored	  at	  face	  value,	  and	  an	  agent,	  who	  exploited	  the	  opportunity	  offered	  by	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  in	  the	  mid	  nineteenth	  century	  to	  enrol	  the	  broadly	  educated	  public,	  and	  scientific	  collective,	  illuminating	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  definition	  of	  physics	  and	  its	  forms	  of	  social	  practice.	  Forbes	  used	  the	  terms	  “physics”	  and	  “natural	  philosophy”	  interchangeably.	  He	  portrayed	  the	  field	  as	  progressed	  by	  the	  natural	  genius	  of	  great	  men,	  who	  curated	  the	  discipline	  within	  an	  associational	  culture	  that	  engendered	  true	  intellectual	  spirit.	  Although	  this	  societal	  mechanism	  was	  becoming	  ineffective,	  Forbes	  did	  not	  see	  university	  institutions	  as	  the	  way	  forward.	  Instead,	  running	  counter	  to	  his	  friend	  William	  Whewell,	  he	  advocated	  inclusion	  of	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  (engineering),	  and	  a	  strictly	  limited	  role	  for	  mathematics.	  He	  revealed	  tensions	  when	  the	  widely	  accepted	  discovery-­‐based	  historiography	  conflicted	  with	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  worth,	  reflecting	  a	  nineteenth-­‐century	  concern	  with	  spirit	  that	  cuts	  across	  twentieth-­‐century	  questions	  about	  discipline	  and	  field.	  	  	  	  
Introduction	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The	  object	  of	  this	  Dissertation	  has	  little	  in	  common	  with	  an	  attempt	  formally	  to	  subdivide	  human	  knowledge	  into	  compartments….	  It	  is	  chiefly	  in	  their	  practical	  bearing	  on	  one	  another	  that	  they	  must	  be	  considered.	  If	  one	  science,	  like	  Mathematics,	  furnish	  the	  only	  sure	  step	  towards	  the	  understanding	  …	  of	  another,	  as	  Astronomy	  or	  Optics,	  a	  practical	  link	  is	  constructed	  between	  them….	  The	  intimate	  and	  reciprocal	  connection	  thus	  subsisting	  between	  Mathematics	  and	  Physics	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  almost	  an	  equal	  degree	  between	  Pure	  Physics	  and	  the	  Mechanical	  Arts,	  of	  which	  we	  take	  Civil	  Engineering	  to	  represent	  the	  department	  most	  cognate	  to	  that	  of	  Natural	  Philosophy….1	  	  This	  characterisation	  of	  physics	  in	  1856	  by	  James	  David	  Forbes	  (1809-­‐68),	  Professor	  of	  Natural	  Philosophy	  at	  Edinburgh,	  is	  notable	  for	  his	  refusal	  to	  erect	  boundaries	  around	  physics,	  his	  emphasis	  on	  relational	  practice,	  and	  his	  use	  of	  “physics”	  and	  “natural	  philosophy”	  as	  interchangeable.	  	  	  Forbes’	  Dissertation	  sixth:	  Exhibiting	  a	  general	  view	  of	  the	  progress	  of	  
mathematical	  and	  physical	  science,	  principally	  from	  1775	  to	  1850,	  was	  written	  for	  the	  eighth	  edition	  of	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica.	  Chronologically,	  it	  fell	  between	  the	  two	  main	  British	  historiographies	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  “physics”:	  right	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  to	  which	  Buchwald	  and	  Hong,	  and	  Morus,	  ascribe	  the	  formation	  of	  physics	  through	  the	  mathematization	  of	  the	  experimental	  sciences	  of	  heat,	  optics,	  electricity	  and	  magnetism.2	  Equally,	  it	  just	  pre-­‐dates	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  physics	  teaching	  into	  university	  laboratories	  in	  Britain,	  and	  the	  associated	  social-­‐institutional	  concerns,	  that	  Gooday	  identifies	  as	  key	  to	  discipline	  formation	  in	  the	  1860s	  and	  ‘70s.3	  	  	  Forbes’	  account	  might,	  then,	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  “physics”	  at	  a	  pivotal	  point	  in	  its	  history,	  situated	  between	  a	  discipline	  that	  identified	  itself	  by	  its	  methods	  –	  originating	  in	  France	  with	  men	  such	  as	  Joseph	  Fourier	  and	  Augustin	  Fresnel,	  and	  curated	  in	  Britain	  by	  Cambridge	  mathematicians	  such	  as	  John	  Herschel,	  George	  Peacock,	  and	  William	  Whewell	  -­‐	  and	  one	  that	  identified	  itself	  by	  its	  institutions.	  However,	  Forbes	  was	  not	  an	  independent	  observer,	  he	  was	  an	  agent	  in	  this	  change,	  as	  recognised	  by	  scholars	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  ‘80s,	  such	  as	  Wilson,	  Harman,	  Olson,	  and	  Smith	  and	  Crosland,	  who	  asserted	  his	  influence	  on	  students	  such	  as	  James	  Clerk	  Maxwell,	  Balfour	  Stewart,	  Peter	  Guthrie	  Tait,	  and	  William	  John	  Macquorn	  Rankine.4	  	  Geographically,	  also,	  Forbes’	  situation	  in	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  changing	  constitution	  of	  “physics”	  is	  ambiguous.	  Born,	  educated,	  and	  based	  through	  most	  of	  his	  career,	  in	  Edinburgh,	  Forbes	  seems	  remote	  from	  either	  account.	  Although	  Morus	  has	  countered	  the	  Cambridge-­‐centric	  view	  of	  the	  earlier	  period	  by	  adding	  London,	  and	  Gooday	  the	  Oxbridge	  dominance	  of	  the	  later	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  the	  rapidly	  expanding	  industrially	  driven	  universities,	  neither	  historiographic	  account	  situates	  the	  action	  in	  Edinburgh.5	  Yet	  Forbes	  travelled	  frequently	  and	  extensively	  across	  Britain	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  and	  was	  an	  inveterate	  networker,	  exchanging	  news,	  books,	  and	  instruments,	  with	  Continental	  workers	  such	  as	  François	  Arago,	  Adolphe	  Quetelet,	  and	  Auguste	  de	  la	  Rive.	  He	  was	  in	  close	  contact	  with	  Cambridge	  mathematicians	  such	  as	  Whewell,	  Herschel,	  and	  George	  Biddell	  Airy,	  becoming	  one	  of	  Morrell	  and	  Thackray’s	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“gentlemen	  of	  science”	  –	  the	  powerful	  coterie	  responsible	  for	  the	  foundation	  and	  subsequent	  success	  of	  the	  British	  Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Science	  (BAAS).6	  He	  was	  both	  removed	  from	  the	  major	  powerhouses	  said	  to	  drive	  the	  development	  of	  institutional	  physics,	  but,	  conversely,	  deeply	  embedded	  among	  the	  cultivators	  of	  physical	  science.	  	  Responding	  to	  such	  ambiguities,	  this	  paper	  takes	  a	  reflexive	  approach.	  It	  views	  Forbes	  both	  as	  a	  witness	  whose	  account	  of	  the	  state	  and	  progress	  of	  physics	  can	  be	  explored	  at	  face	  value,	  and	  as	  an	  agent	  whose	  exploitation	  of	  the	  opportunity	  offered	  by	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  in	  the	  mid	  nineteenth	  century	  is	  worth	  examining	  for	  what	  it	  tells	  us	  about	  the	  boundaries	  of	  physics	  and	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  definition	  of	  physics	  and	  its	  form	  of	  social	  practice.	  	  	  Yeo	  associates	  the	  shift	  in	  emphasis	  in	  British	  encyclopaedias	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  from	  classification	  of	  universal	  knowledge,	  to	  “detailed	  entries	  on	  scientific	  disciplines	  by	  expert	  contributors”,	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  specialised	  disciplines	  from	  natural	  philosophy.7	  Alongside	  textbooks	  and	  specialised	  journals,	  Stichweh	  identifies	  encyclopaedia	  entries,	  written	  by	  specialists	  and	  increasingly	  read	  by	  specialists,	  as	  the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  disciplines	  self-­‐organise.	  But	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  this	  internal	  process	  requires	  supporting	  external	  cultural	  conditions	  and	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  potential	  specialists	  –	  criteria	  that	  were	  met	  in	  the	  case	  of	  German	  physics.8	  No	  such	  conditions	  applied	  in	  Scotland	  until	  the	  mid	  nineteenth	  century.	  Its	  five	  universities,	  with	  one	  professor	  of	  natural	  philosophy	  and	  one	  of	  mathematics	  in	  each,	  were	  not	  enough	  to	  provide	  an	  internal	  disciplinary	  physics	  network	  divorced	  from	  the	  wider	  educated	  elite,	  until	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.	  Forbes’	  own	  family	  were	  typical	  of	  the	  landed	  gentry,	  lawyers,	  and	  bankers	  who	  formed	  the	  major	  part	  of	  the	  local	  audience	  for	  science,	  especially	  in	  Edinburgh	  where	  the	  university	  was	  under	  civic	  control.	  The	  content	  of	  mathematico-­‐physical	  science	  held	  little	  attraction	  for	  them	  and	  they	  related	  better	  to	  natural	  sciences.9	  In	  reponse,	  Scottish	  professors	  of	  natural	  philosophy,	  whose	  inadequate	  “fixed”	  salaries	  were	  supplemented	  by	  student	  fees,	  retained	  a	  curriculum	  that	  was	  generally	  accessible	  to	  all	  social	  and	  professional	  types,	  insisting	  that	  their	  subject	  remain	  a	  core	  part	  of	  the	  “M.A.”	  (first	  arts	  degree).10	  This	  limited	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  could	  produce	  specialists	  in	  physical	  science.	  	  	  	  Outside	  the	  elite,	  there	  were	  three	  other	  sources	  of	  potential	  specialists,	  found	  in	  other	  localities:	  the	  medical	  community,	  military	  academies,	  and	  the	  growing	  artisan	  group.11	  Although	  Edinburgh	  had	  had	  a	  world-­‐leading	  medical	  community,	  this	  was	  weakening	  by	  the	  1820s.	  In	  contrast	  to	  London,	  natural	  philosophy	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  part	  of	  its	  medical	  degree	  and	  the	  plethora	  of	  public	  lectures	  of	  the	  mid	  eighteenth	  century	  had	  given	  way	  to	  chemistry	  by	  around	  1800.12	  Nor	  were	  there	  military	  academies	  nearby:	  Scottish	  mathematicians	  such	  as	  James	  Ivory	  and	  William	  Wallace	  had	  to	  move	  south	  for	  such	  employment.	  So,	  unlike	  the	  French	  situation	  described	  by	  Simon,	  or	  that	  around	  London,	  there	  was	  little	  demand	  for	  circulation	  of	  medically-­‐	  or	  militarily-­‐oriented	  textbooks	  to	  prompt	  	  formation	  of	  physics	  as	  a	  discipline	  in	  Scotland.13	  	  Perhaps	  more	  significant,	  but	  under-­‐explored	  by	  Scottish	  historians,	  was	  the	  growing	  nexus	  of	  science-­‐	  and	  technology-­‐oriented	  colleges,	  improvement	  societies,	  and	  mechanics	  institutes	  for	  artisans.14	  By	  1851	  there	  were	  55	  adult	  education	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institutions	  of	  some	  type	  across	  Scotland,	  with	  over	  12,500	  members.	  England	  had	  610,	  and	  over	  102000	  members.15	  The	  Edinburgh	  School	  of	  Arts	  awarded	  a	  Diploma	  of	  Life	  Membership	  on	  successful	  completion	  of	  a	  three-­‐year	  course	  in	  mathematics,	  chemistry,	  and	  natural	  philosophy;	  from	  1835	  to	  1851	  they	  awarded	  46.16	  In	  1824,	  three	  years	  after	  the	  Edinburgh	  School	  of	  Arts	  was	  founded,	  a	  commentator	  declared,	  “A	  spirit	  has	  been	  awakened,	  which,	  if	  properly	  directed,	  may	  be	  productive	  of	  the	  most	  beneficial	  effects….”17	  The	  
Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  Edinburgh-­‐based	  Forbes	  to	  supply	  “proper	  direction”	  to	  artisans,	  while	  simultaneously	  both	  shaping	  the	  established	  community	  of	  cultivators	  of	  physical	  science	  and	  enrolling	  the	  educated	  elite	  into	  the	  values	  of	  scientific	  men	  and	  philosophers	  as	  he	  saw	  them.18	  His	  Dissertation	  can	  be	  read	  both	  as	  a	  testament	  of	  what	  physics	  was	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  as	  a	  manifesto	  for	  the	  second	  half.	  	  When	  he	  wrote	  Dissertation	  Sixth,	  Forbes	  was	  in	  his	  mid	  40s,	  and	  well	  established	  figure	  in	  British	  science.	  The	  over-­‐protected	  youngest	  son	  of	  an	  influential	  Scottish	  banking	  family,	  he	  had	  decided	  early	  on	  a	  career	  in	  physical	  science	  and	  pursued	  his	  goal	  relentlessly	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  dedicated	  hard	  work	  and	  family	  influence.	  In	  1833,	  aged	  23,	  he	  mounted	  an	  intensely	  political	  campaign	  that	  saw	  him	  elected	  Professor	  of	  Natural	  Philosophy	  at	  Edinburgh	  in	  preference	  to	  his	  mentor,	  Sir	  David	  Brewster.	  His	  best-­‐known	  scientific	  work	  was	  the	  demonstration	  of	  the	  polarisation	  of	  radiant	  heat	  (1834-­‐44),	  and	  his	  extensive	  observational	  and	  theoretical	  work	  on	  the	  flow	  of	  glaciers	  in	  the	  1840s.	  In	  both	  areas	  he	  became	  embroiled	  in	  controversy.	  In	  1859,	  following	  eight	  years	  of	  precarious	  health,	  he	  moved	  from	  Edinburgh	  to	  the	  sinecure	  job	  of	  Principal	  of	  the	  United	  College	  at	  St	  Andrews.	  He	  died	  of	  consumption	  in	  1868.19	  Dissertation	  Sixth	  was	  the	  sequel	  to	  previous	  
Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  dissertations	  by	  Forbes’	  predecessors	  in	  the	  Edinburgh	  chair,	  John	  Playfair	  and	  Sir	  John	  Leslie.	  	  This	  paper	  first	  explores	  the	  expectations	  Forbes	  might	  have	  had	  of	  the	  
Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  as	  a	  site	  for	  discipline	  formation,	  before	  examining	  some	  of	  the	  broad	  features	  of	  his	  views:	  that	  physical	  science	  was	  led	  by	  “great	  men”,	  demarcated	  by	  their	  moral	  character;	  his	  possible	  view	  that	  the	  progress	  of	  physics	  was	  periodic;	  and	  the	  triumvirate	  of	  mathematics-­‐physical	  science-­‐mechanical	  arts.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  draws	  also	  on	  a	  much	  briefer	  article	  that	  Forbes	  wrote	  two	  years	  later,	  “The	  History	  of	  Science	  and	  Some	  of	  its	  Lessons”.20	  Unless	  otherwise	  stated,	  quotations	  are	  from	  the	  Dissertation.	  
	  	  
Constituting	  physics	  through	  the	  Dissertation	  Sixth	  	  Forbes’	  encyclopaedia	  entry,	  Dissertation	  Sixth,	  provides	  a	  lens	  to	  examine	  physics	  as	  a	  cognitive,	  practical,	  and	  social	  enterprise.	  Like	  the	  textbooks	  discussed	  by	  Simon,	  encyclopaedias	  provided	  a	  nexus	  for	  the	  role	  of	  publishers,	  the	  book	  trade,	  readers,	  and	  men	  of	  science,	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  physics.21	  This	  section	  examines	  the	  opportunities	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  offered	  for	  making	  and	  managing	  physical	  science	  and	  Forbes’	  position	  within	  it.	  He	  exploited	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  reputation	  of	  the	  Britannica	  and	  its	  rapidly	  
Falconer:	  “Phases	  of	  Physics	  in	  J.D.	  Forbes…,”	  in	  History	  of	  Science	  	  	  
	  
p5	  
expanding	  readership,	  to	  promote	  his	  own	  reputation,	  and	  enlist	  other	  men	  of	  science	  into	  what	  was,	  effectively,	  a	  work	  of	  collective	  authorship,	  that	  portrayed	  science	  as	  a	  moral	  enterprise.	  	  By	  1850	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  was	  becoming	  pre-­‐eminent	  among	  competitors	  such	  as	  Coleridge’s	  Encyclopaedia	  Metropolitana,	  or	  Brewster’s	  
Edinburgh	  Encyclopaedia.22	  All	  gave	  prominence	  to	  science	  and	  technology,	  and	  were	  sold	  in	  parts	  or	  by	  subscription,	  but	  differed	  in	  intended	  audience,	  price,	  and	  organisational	  structure.	  Lardner’s	  Cabinet	  Cyclopaedia,	  for	  example,	  was	  part	  of	  the	  drive	  for	  cheap	  educational	  publications	  of	  the	  1820s	  and	  30s,	  aimed	  at	  the	  middle	  and	  wealthier	  working	  classes.	  Volumes	  of	  the	  Cabinet	  Cyclopaedia,	  sold	  for	  six	  shillings,	  compared	  to	  around	  35	  shillings	  a	  volume	  for	  the	  seventh	  edition	  of	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica.23	  	  	  Unlike	  textbooks	  and	  book	  collections	  such	  as	  the	  Library	  of	  Useful	  Knowledge,	  encyclopaedias	  wrestled	  with	  the	  tension	  between	  providing	  a	  unified	  view	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  fragmentation	  necessary	  for	  readable,	  focused,	  sections,	  and	  publication	  as	  a	  series	  of	  issues.	  Most	  adopted	  some	  sort	  of	  alphabetical	  ordering	  though	  Coleridge	  in	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Metropolitana	  attempted	  to	  retain	  a	  logical	  structure.24	  Since	  its	  inception,	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  
Britannica	  had	  tackled	  the	  problem	  through	  a	  dual	  system	  of	  ‘treatises’	  covering	  an	  entire	  subject	  field,	  and	  ‘articles’	  focusing	  on	  terms	  and	  topics	  within	  a	  field.25	  All	  appeared	  in	  the	  same	  alphabetical	  sequence,	  but	  were	  distinguished	  by	  length	  and	  typography.	  Into	  this	  organisational	  system,	  Edinburgh	  publisher	  Archibald	  Constable	  and	  his	  editor	  Macvey	  Napier	  introduced	  a	  new	  binding	  element:	  extended	  “preliminary	  dissertations”	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  volume	  of	  the	  Supplement	  (1815-­‐24)	  to	  the	  fourth,	  fifth	  and	  sixth	  editions,	  Their	  inspiration	  was	  D’Alembert’s	  “Preliminary	  Discourse”	  to	  the	  Encyclopédie,	  stressing	  Enlightenment	  ideals	  of	  progress	  providing	  a	  coherent	  historical	  framework	  for	  a	  cognate	  body	  of	  knowledge.26	  	  The	  first	  dissertation,	  by	  Dugald	  Stewart	  on	  the	  “Progress	  of	  Metaphysical,	  Ethical	  and	  Political	  Philosophy”	  was	  followed	  by	  John	  Playfair’s	  on	  the	  “Progress	  of	  Mathematical	  and	  Physical	  Science”	  up	  to	  1750	  and	  William	  Brande’s	  on	  the	  “progress	  of	  chemical	  philosophy”.	  For	  the	  seventh	  edition	  of	  the	  Encyclopaedia,	  Napier	  and	  the	  new	  owners,	  A&C	  Black,	  added	  John	  Leslie’s	  sequel	  to	  Playfair’s	  Dissertation,	  and	  James	  Mackintosh’s	  companion	  to	  Stewart,	  but	  Brande’s	  was	  dropped.	  	  	  Thomas	  Traill,	  professor	  of	  medical	  jurisprudence	  at	  Edinburgh,	  succeeded	  Napier	  as	  editor	  for	  the	  eighth	  edition	  in	  the	  1850s,	  but	  little	  change	  in	  disciplinary	  approach	  is	  discernible.	  Traill’s	  preface	  was	  an	  abridgement	  and	  brief	  update	  of	  Napier’s.	  He	  retained	  the	  broad	  boundaries	  established	  by	  Napier	  when	  he	  re-­‐numbered	  the	  dissertations	  and	  added	  two	  more	  to	  the	  existing	  four:	  Richard	  Whately’s	  Dissertation	  Third,	  on	  the	  “Rise,	  Progress	  and	  Corruptions	  of	  Christianity”,	  and	  Forbes’	  Dissertation	  Sixth,	  which	  formed	  a	  sequel	  to	  Playfair’s	  and	  Leslie’s,	  bringing	  the	  account	  of	  mathematical	  and	  physical	  science	  right	  up	  to	  date.	  	  	  Traill	  commissioned	  Dissertation	  Sixth	  in	  1852.	  Forbes,	  then	  in	  his	  early	  40s,	  was	  away	  from	  Edinburgh	  for	  two	  years	  being	  treated	  for	  consumption	  by	  John	  Addington	  Symonds	  in	  Clifton,	  Bristol.	  He	  initially	  declined	  on	  health	  grounds	  -­‐	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but	  subsequently	  agreed,	  provided	  he	  could	  extend	  the	  deadline	  and	  raise	  his	  fee.27	  The	  dissertation	  was	  eventually	  issued	  free	  along	  with	  volume	  12	  in	  1856.	  It	  was	  published	  separately	  in	  1858.28	  	  	  By	  the	  time	  Traill	  commissioned	  Forbes’	  Dissertation,	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  
Britannica	  had	  acquired	  a	  national,	  and	  even	  international,	  reputation.	  Beginning	  in	  1815,	  Constable	  and	  Napier	  had	  recruited	  big	  name	  specialist	  authors,	  giving	  the	  London	  elite	  a	  stake,	  and	  abandoned	  the	  traditional	  anonymity	  of	  articles;	  the	  Britannica	  as	  a	  whole	  became	  the	  work	  of	  a	  collective	  of	  experts.	  Constable	  and	  Napier’s	  break	  with	  the	  previous	  tradition,	  of	  encyclopaedias	  written	  largely	  by	  their	  editors,	  was	  a	  move	  soon	  copied	  by	  other	  major	  encyclopaedias	  such	  as	  the	  Metropolitana	  and	  the	  New	  Cyclopaedia.29	  By	  1854	  the	  “Encylopädie”	  entry	  in	  the	  Leipzig-­‐based	  Kleineres	  Brockhaus’sches	  Conversations	  Lexikon	  für	  den	  
Handgebrauch	  claimed	  that	  no	  encyclopaedia	  of	  scientific	  importance	  had	  appeared	  in	  France	  since	  1832,	  but	  that	  England	  had	  numerous	  extensive	  and	  expensive	  encyclopaedias,	  of	  which	  the	  foremost	  was	  the	  Britannica.30	  Since	  1790	  editions	  of	  the	  Britannica	  had	  circulated	  widely	  in	  North	  America	  in	  both	  agreed	  and	  pirated	  versions.31	  	  Thus	  Forbes	  would	  expect	  a	  sizeable	  home,	  and	  perhaps	  overseas	  audience.	  In	  Britain	  the	  potential	  readership	  grew	  as	  literacy	  rose	  and	  publication	  costs	  came	  down,	  but	  also	  as	  public	  appetite	  for	  “improvement”	  literature	  increased.32	  In	  Scotland,	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  was	  the	  second	  most	  borrowed	  title	  from	  the	  Leightonian	  Library	  at	  Dunblane,	  being	  checked	  out	  48	  times	  between	  1780	  and	  1833.	  Its	  borrowers	  included	  ministers,	  writers,	  surgeons	  and	  landed	  gentlemen.33	  It	  was	  also	  listed	  in	  151	  of	  the	  395	  post-­‐1770	  library	  catalogues	  surveyed	  by	  Towsey;	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  the	  Forbes	  family’s	  well-­‐stocked	  library	  contained	  a	  copy.34	  The	  Edinburgh	  Mechanics’	  Subscription	  Library	  held	  both	  the	  sixth	  and	  seventh	  editions,	  and	  Constable’s	  Supplements,	  giving	  a	  potential	  readership	  of	  1200.35	  In	  Britain	  as	  a	  whole,	  by	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  non-­‐religious	  improvement	  publications,	  such	  as	  the	  Britannica	  accounted	  for	  half	  of	  total	  booksellers’	  stock,	  and	  circulating	  libraries	  typically	  contained	  eighty	  per	  cent	  “standard	  nonfiction”.36	  	  	  But	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  educated	  public	  who	  read	  works,	  and	  the	  learned	  authors	  who	  wrote	  them,	  were	  blurring.	  In	  Germany,	  Phillips	  views	  this	  erosion	  as	  defined	  by	  ever-­‐lower	  barriers	  to	  authorship.37	  	  But	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  
Britannica	  demonstrates,	  that	  in	  Britain	  blurring	  was	  equally	  defined	  by	  readership.	  By	  1827	  Napier,	  arguing	  with	  the	  new	  owners,	  A&C	  Black	  that	  scientific	  articles	  should	  not	  be	  curtailed	  to	  save	  money,	  noted	  that,	  “Encyclopaedias	  have	  risen	  into	  consequence	  with	  an	  important	  and	  influential	  class,	  for	  whose	  use	  they	  were	  not	  originally	  designed	  …	  they	  are	  now	  regularly	  perused	  or	  consulted	  by	  men	  of	  science,	  and	  the	  whole	  body	  of	  the	  learned.”38	  Topham	  points	  out	  that	  the	  object	  of	  this	  reading	  was	  often	  social,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  discuss	  science	  in	  learned	  but	  general	  societies	  and	  fashionable	  parties.39	  Such	  reading	  by	  scientific	  specialists	  was	  an	  expectation	  in	  1856	  when	  The	  
Athenaeum,	  reviewed	  Forbes’	  Dissertation:	  “Many	  persons,	  competently	  informed	  as	  to	  some	  of	  the	  chapters,	  will	  gain	  their	  first	  knowledge	  about	  the	  subjects	  of	  others	  from	  the	  chapters	  themselves.”40	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Through	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  boundary	  work	  of	  differentiating	  men	  of	  science	  from	  the	  wider	  educated	  public	  moved	  towards	  participation	  in	  specialist	  societies	  and	  publications.41	  But,	  as	  the	  example	  of	  Forbes	  and	  the	  
Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  shows,	  in	  Britain	  in	  the	  1850s	  it	  was	  still	  deemed	  desirable	  for	  a	  devotee	  of	  physical	  science	  to	  define	  himself	  within	  a	  broad	  learned	  public.	  Forbes	  participated	  both	  in	  increasingly	  dedicated	  scientific	  societies,	  such	  as	  the	  BAAS	  –	  itself	  subdivided	  into	  sections	  -­‐	  and	  in	  more	  generalist	  but	  “learned”	  societies	  such	  as	  the	  Royal	  Society	  of	  Edinburgh	  (RSE),	  to	  which	  he	  was	  elected	  in	  1831.	  He	  was	  General	  Secretary	  1840-­‐60,	  and	  proposed	  writers	  and	  artists,	  as	  well	  as	  men	  of	  science,	  for	  fellowship.42	  He	  published	  in	  specifically	  scientific	  journals,	  but	  wrote	  also	  in	  the	  Edinburgh	  and	  
Quarterly	  Reviews,	  adhering	  to	  a	  publication	  pattern	  of	  an	  older	  generation.	  In	  his	  Dissertation	  Forbes	  was	  consciously	  writing	  both	  for	  a	  general	  educated	  readership	  and	  for	  men	  of	  science,	  audiences	  that	  paralleled	  his	  own	  career	  development	  through	  social	  networking	  and	  institutional	  position.	  	  	  Forbes	  would	  not	  have	  undertaken	  the	  task	  unless	  he	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  enhance	  his	  reputation	  with	  both	  groups	  –	  the	  physical	  science	  men,	  and	  the	  general	  educated.	  He	  used	  the	  risk	  to	  his	  reputation	  as	  a	  bargaining	  counter	  to	  increase	  his	  fee	  from	  £200	  to	  £350	  –	  approaching	  a	  year’s	  “fixed	  salary”	  for	  a	  Scottish	  Professor	  -­‐	  and	  for	  authority	  to	  extend	  beyond	  the	  contracted	  100	  pages.43	  Among	  the	  educated	  public,	  his	  reputational	  expectations	  will	  have	  been	  set	  by	  the	  success	  of	  previous	  editions.	  Playfair’s	  and	  Leslie’s	  dissertations	  were	  widely	  quoted.	  The	  seventh	  edition	  of	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  had	  sold	  over	  5000	  complete	  sets,	  plus	  many	  more	  bought	  in	  parts.	  The	  Athenaeum	  considered	  it,	  “the	  most	  valuable	  digest	  of	  human	  knowledge	  that	  has	  yet	  appeared	  in	  Britain.”44	  	  	  Among	  cultivators	  of	  physical	  science	  Forbes	  was	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the,	  “obvious	  delicacy	  of	  dealing	  with	  contemporary	  or	  almost	  contemporary	  reputations.”45	  	  He	  mitigated	  the	  risk	  by	  canvassing	  widely	  for	  information	  and	  views.46	  The	  willingness	  with	  which	  these	  men	  cooperated	  shows	  that	  they,	  too,	  considered	  this	  work	  an	  important	  disciplinary	  enterprise.	  While	  Forbes	  was	  the	  sole	  named	  author	  of	  the	  Dissertation,	  its	  writing	  was,	  to	  some	  extent,	  a	  collective	  action.	  Although	  much	  of	  the	  writing	  was	  Forbes’	  own,	  he	  included	  unacknowledged	  extracts	  from	  his	  correspondents;	  that	  no	  one	  complained	  suggests	  that	  they	  not	  only	  expected	  this,	  but	  believed	  that	  getting	  their	  views	  heard	  was	  more	  important	  than	  personal	  credit.	  The	  Glasgow	  Professor	  of	  Natural	  Philosophy,	  William	  Thomson,	  for	  example,	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  establish	  Henry	  Cavendish’s	  credentials	  as	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  mathematical	  theory	  of	  electricity	  through	  an	  ostensibly	  independent	  and	  authoritative	  witness.47	  The	  account	  he	  initially	  sent	  to	  Forbes	  dwelt	  long	  on	  Cavendish	  but	  omitted	  Coulomb	  almost	  entirely,	  and	  Forbes	  challenged	  this.48	  By	  proof	  stage,	  he	  had	  cut	  down	  Thomson’s	  views	  considerably,	  and	  supplemented	  them	  with	  an	  account	  of	  Coulomb	  based	  on	  Whewell’s	  History	  of	  the	  Inductive	  Sciences.49	  But	  Thomson	  reiterated	  the	  importance	  of	  Cavendish,	  sending	  two	  long	  additional	  paragraphs,	  which	  Forbes	  now	  included.50	  Humphrey	  Lloyd,	  the	  Dublin	  Natural	  Philosopher,	  engaged	  in	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  credit	  due	  to	  Brewster,	  while	  Edinburgh’s	  Professor	  of	  Technology,	  George	  Wilson,	  contributed	  substantially	  to	  finessing	  James	  Watt’s	  reputation,	  whose	  possible	  priority	  over	  Cavendish	  on	  the	  composition	  of	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water,	  and	  indebtedness	  to	  Joseph	  Black	  over	  latent	  heat,	  were	  subjects	  of	  considerable	  controversy.51	  The	  high	  density	  of	  footnotes	  in	  Forbes’	  account	  of	  Watt	  demonstrates	  his	  anticipation	  of	  criticism	  here.52	  	  However,	  Forbes	  was	  prepared	  to	  take	  his	  own	  line.	  This	  is	  particularly	  evident	  when	  he	  draws	  on	  lesser-­‐known	  Continental	  sources.	  An	  example	  is	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  Italian	  physician,	  Luigi	  Galvani.	  During	  his	  Continental	  tour	  of	  1844,	  Forbes	  met	  the	  physicist	  Silvestro	  Gherardi,	  who	  had	  examined	  Galvani’s	  manuscripts	  thoroughly.	  The	  two	  men	  subsequently	  exchanged	  books	  and	  instruments.53	  	  The	  resultant	  account	  in	  Dissertation	  Sixth	  is	  detailed,	  and	  much	  more	  favourable	  to	  Galvani	  than	  was	  customary	  in	  British	  publications,	  preferring	  him	  to	  Volta.54	  Similarly,	  when	  discussing	  the	  discovery	  of	  Neptune,	  Forbes	  sought	  detailed	  information	  about	  Leverrier’s	  background	  and	  work	  from	  his	  friend,	  the	  Swiss	  astronomer,	  Émile	  Gautier.	  His	  treatment	  gave	  far	  too	  little	  credit	  to	  Cambridge	  astronomy	  for	  Airy’s	  liking,	  but	  Forbes	  did	  little	  to	  amend	  it.55	  	  Remarkably,	  the	  editor,	  Traill,	  and	  publishers,	  A&C	  Black	  had	  little	  input,	  contrasting	  with	  the	  experiences	  of	  textbook	  authors	  later	  in	  the	  century	  described	  by	  Mitchell.56	  Despite	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  national	  and	  international	  experts,	  for	  this	  dissertation	  they	  remained	  rooted	  in	  Edinburgh,	  “Convinced	  …	  that	  the	  supplemental	  essay	  should,	  like	  the	  two	  first	  parts,	  proceed	  from	  one	  of	  our	  own	  professors	  …”	  (Traill’s	  emphasis).57	  Having	  secured	  Forbes’	  assistance,	  they	  acceded	  to	  all	  his	  suggestions:	  the	  scope	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  essay,	  the	  increase	  in	  fee,	  and	  that	  the	  eventual	  dissertation	  was	  twice	  the	  contracted	  length.	  Since	  Adam	  Black	  had	  to	  bear	  the	  extra	  cost	  himself,	  his	  forbearance	  is	  remarkable.	  It	  demonstrates	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  growing	  gulf	  between	  scientific	  specialists	  and	  the	  generally	  educated,	  but	  also	  successful	  enrolment	  of	  the	  public	  into	  the	  value	  of	  science	  by	  the	  1850s:	  “In	  regard	  to	  its	  limits	  we	  are	  not	  proper	  judges,	  we	  are	  influenced	  by	  commercial	  considerations	  &	  convenience	  of	  size	  which	  we	  acknowledge	  to	  be	  unworthy	  of	  the	  subject	  &	  willingly	  yield	  to	  your	  superior	  views.”58	  The	  Blacks	  thus	  subordinated	  the	  commercial	  to	  the	  purported	  moral	  value	  of	  science	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
	  
	  
Men	  of	  Science	  –	  managing	  the	  audience	  for	  physics	  	  Forbes	  was	  not	  only	  defining	  physical	  science	  in	  the	  Dissertation,	  he	  was	  attempting	  to	  manage	  its	  audience	  and	  negotiate	  its	  cultural	  position.	  Although	  less	  dramatic	  than	  François	  Arago’s	  position	  in	  post-­‐revolutionary	  France,	  described	  by	  Levitt,	  Forbes	  faced	  a	  similar	  issue:	  “how	  to	  come	  to	  agreement	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  single	  external	  authority.”59	  Forbes’	  early	  experimental	  work	  on	  the	  polarization	  of	  radiant	  heat,	  was	  closely	  associated	  with	  that	  of	  Arago	  and	  Biot;	  he	  was	  deeply	  implicated	  in	  the	  “optical	  revolution”	  and	  associated	  downfall	  of	  Newtonian	  authority.	  The	  solution	  he	  implicitly	  set	  before	  the	  public	  in	  the	  Dissertation	  lay	  not	  so	  much	  in	  scientific	  method	  as	  in	  inculcating	  proper	  “spirit”	  among	  “great	  men”	  marked	  by	  their	  natural	  genius	  and	  moral	  qualities.	  “Spirit”,	  rather	  than	  mathematical	  concepts,	  unified	  Forbes’	  science.	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The	  impact	  of	  the	  imagined	  public	  with	  whom	  Forbes	  was	  negotiating	  is	  evident	  in	  his	  decision	  to	  organise	  the	  work	  around	  “great	  men”.	  Displaying	  a	  keen	  appreciation	  of	  his	  wider	  readership,	  their	  interests	  and	  ways	  of	  thinking,	  he	  explained	  to	  them	  that	  this	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  the	  account	  “lively”	  and	  “escape	  the	  formality	  of	  a	  history	  of	  science”	  (p801).60	  The	  readers	  of	  improving	  literature	  in	  Scotland,	  and	  probably	  England	  also,	  displayed	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  history	  and	  biography.61	  Forbes	  exploited	  this	  preference	  to	  woo	  his	  audience.	  The	  mathematician,	  Augustus	  de	  Morgan,	  writing	  in,	  The	  Athenaeum	  judged	  this	  a	  successful	  move:	  “the	  biographical	  notices	  and	  anecdotes,	  which	  form	  part	  of	  the	  body	  of	  the	  accounts,	  will	  give	  relief	  and	  heighten	  interest.”62	  	  To	  Traill,	  Forbes	  revealed	  that	  he	  was	  following	  the	  model	  of	  Sir	  James	  Mackintosh’s	  	  Preliminary	  Dissertation	  on	  the	  Progress	  of	  Ethical	  Philosophy,	  for	  the	  seventh	  edition	  of	  the	  Encyclopedia	  Britannica,	  which	  had	  interpolated	  biographical	  anecdotes	  into	  the	  discussion.	  Traill	  agreed	  that,	  “Your	  plan	  of	  taking	  the	  most	  eminent	  in	  each	  branch,	  as	  the	  spindles	  or	  axes	  round	  which	  you	  are	  to	  bind	  the	  scientific	  fabric,	  is	  excellent,”	  suggesting	  that,	  like	  Forbes,	  he	  viewed	  individual	  character	  as	  key	  to	  disciplinary	  progress.	  63	  In	  attributing	  science	  so	  emphatically	  to	  individuals,	  Forbes	  broke	  with	  his	  predecessors,	  showing	  a	  shift	  towards	  post-­‐Enlightenment	  Romanticism	  consequent	  on	  the	  breakdown	  of	  Newtonian	  authority.64	  Unlike	  Playfair	  and	  Leslie,	  who	  had	  focused	  their	  Preliminary	  Dissertations	  on	  the	  rational	  development	  of	  concepts,	  stressing	  mathematical	  analysis	  and	  inductive	  experiment	  as	  the	  twin	  principles	  driving	  physical	  science,	  Forbes	  aimed,	  “to	  select	  the	  more	  striking	  land-­‐marks	  of	  progress	  in	  each	  …	  age,	  and	  …	  connect	  them	  with	  the	  character	  …	  of	  all	  the	  more	  eminent	  discoverers….”(p802	  my	  emphasis).	  Attribution	  to	  individuals	  became	  a	  British	  trait	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  that	  acted	  to	  associate	  science	  strongly	  with	  moral	  worth.65	  	  Differentiation	  from	  Whewell	  was	  another	  reason	  for	  Forbes’	  biographical	  approach.66	  Forbes	  saw	  Whewell’s	  History	  of	  the	  Inductive	  Sciences,	  as	  both	  his	  main	  inspiration	  and	  his	  chief	  rival,	  judging	  by	  the	  remarks	  scattered	  through	  his	  correspondence	  and	  the	  Dissertation.	  Whewell	  had	  privileged	  “discoverers”	  in	  his	  work,	  but	  was	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  discovery	  status	  based	  on	  inductive	  method,	  rather	  than	  with	  character.	  According	  to	  Schaffer,	  the	  historiographic	  role	  assigned	  to	  discoverers	  by	  Whewell,	  marks	  a	  disciplinary	  shift	  from	  natural	  philosophy’s	  belief	  in	  the	  power	  of	  pure	  induction,	  to	  physics’	  recognition	  that	  inductive	  progress	  depended	  on	  intuitive	  genius.67	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  epigraph,	  Forbes,	  writing	  nearly	  twenty	  years	  later,	  appears	  to	  use	  “physics”	  or	  “natural	  philosophy”	  merely	  for	  stylistic	  convenience.68	  However,	  any	  man	  of	  science	  worthy	  of	  inclusion	  in	  the	  Dissertation	  ranked	  as	  a	  “philosopher”.69	  Whewellian	  themes	  of	  genius,	  discovery,	  and	  selection	  played	  important	  roles,	  but	  were	  trumped	  by	  character.	  	  	  The	  choice	  of	  subjects	  in	  Dissertation	  Sixth	  overlaped	  considerably	  with	  that	  of	  Forbes’	  lectures	  in	  natural	  philosophy	  at	  Edinburgh.70	  	  But	  the	  priority	  and	  ordering	  differs:	  the	  Dissertation	  devotes	  far	  more	  space	  to	  engineering	  and	  astronomy.	  Forbes	  divided	  the	  mathematical	  and	  physical	  sciences	  into	  seven	  broad	  branches:	  Physical	  Astronomy	  and	  Analytical	  Mechanics;	  Astronomy;	  Mechanics,	  Civil	  Engineering	  and	  Acoustics;	  Optics;	  Heat	  including	  Chemical	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Philosophy;71	  Electricity	  and	  Magnetism.	  These	  represented	  his	  own	  compilation	  of	  the	  divisions	  of	  Playfair’s,	  and	  Leslie’s	  Dissertations,	  but	  with	  Engineering	  added	  in.	  However,	  unlike	  his	  predecessors,	  who	  had	  both	  been	  Professors	  of	  Mathematics	  before	  taking	  the	  Edinburgh	  Chair	  in	  Natural	  Philosophy,	  Forbes	  had	  little	  formal	  mathematical	  training	  and,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  penultimate	  section,	  he	  left	  pure	  mathematics	  out.	  He	  subdivided	  each	  branch	  further	  and	  mapped	  each	  great	  man	  to	  one	  of	  the	  subdivisions.	  	  These	  were	  subdivisions	  of	  knowledge,	  but	  not	  of	  socio-­‐institutional	  disciplines:	  many	  of	  his	  great	  men	  worked	  across	  multiple	  subdivisions.	  	  Despite	  his	  explicitly	  broad	  opening	  definition	  of	  the	  field	  of	  mathematical	  and	  physical	  science,	  Forbes’	  implicit	  definition	  was	  much	  narrower;	  it	  encompassed	  only	  those	  areas	  of	  observational	  or	  experimental	  science	  to	  which	  mathematics	  had	  been	  applied.	  The	  study	  of	  heat,	  Forbes	  judged,	  had	  moved	  from	  chemistry	  to	  physics	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  as	  it	  acquired	  quantitative	  laws.	  	  Dalton’s	  atomic	  and	  gaseous	  theories,	  being	  quantifiable,	  also	  had,	  “a	  strongly	  physical	  aspect”	  (p925).72	  However,	  as	  noted	  by	  Wilson,	  despite	  his	  quantitative	  bias,	  Forbes	  gave	  no	  hint	  of	  conceptual	  unity	  between	  the	  branches	  of	  physics	  and	  shied	  away	  from	  the	  mathematical	  abstractions	  through	  which	  William	  Thomson	  and	  others	  were	  already	  seeking	  unification.73	  	  	  Thus,	  Forbes’	  account	  was	  written	  in	  a	  transitional	  period	  before	  unifying	  concerns	  had	  taken	  firm	  hold,	  and	  he	  minimised	  such	  concerns,	  showing	  himself	  out	  of	  line	  with	  the	  developing,	  and	  younger,	  “North	  British”	  nexus	  described	  by	  Smith.74	  	  Despite	  being	  closely	  involved	  in	  publication	  of	  Thomson’s	  papers	  on	  heat	  in	  the	  RSE’s	  Transactions	  and	  Proceedings	  from	  1849	  on,	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  General	  Secretary,	  Forbes	  did	  not	  consult	  Thomson	  on	  the	  heat	  section	  of	  the	  
Dissertation.	  He	  gave	  Carnot	  only	  passing	  mention,	  and	  included	  only	  one	  paragraph	  on	  Joule	  and	  the	  mechanical	  equivalent	  of	  heat,	  commenting	  privately	  that	  he	  deemed	  Thomson’s	  admiration	  of	  Joule,	  “scarcely	  rational”.75	  He	  concluded	  that,	  “a	  larger	  induction	  is	  still	  required,”	  but	  that,	  “there	  is	  a	  basis	  of	  important	  truth	  in	  the	  matter	  which	  well	  deserves	  farther	  enquiry”	  (p942).	  When	  Whewell	  challenged	  the	  discovery	  status	  of	  the	  mechanical	  equivalent	  of	  heat:	  “I	  believe	  it	  rather	  on	  Wm.	  Thomson’s	  authority,	  than	  because	  I	  have	  satisfied	  myself.	  Are	  you	  quite	  satisfied?”	  76	  Forbes	  responded	  that	  he	  thought,	  “pretty	  much	  as	  you	  do.	  I	  intended	  to	  speak	  of	  it	  with	  great	  caution,	  and	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  I	  have	  done	  so.”77	  The	  dynamical	  theory	  of	  heat	  was	  prominent	  at	  the	  BAAS	  meeting	  the	  following	  year,	  and	  the	  two	  men	  agreed	  on	  their	  reservations	  about	  it.78	  	  	  What	  does	  unify	  Forbes’	  account	  is	  the	  moral	  and	  intellectual	  character	  of	  the	  men	  involved	  –	  the	  “spirit”	  of	  their	  enterprise.	  He	  had	  fashioned	  his	  own	  scientific	  identity	  around	  such	  spirit:	  glossed	  as	  disinterested	  “zeal”	  and	  “ardour”,	  it	  was	  his	  outstanding	  attribute	  according	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  sixty-­‐one	  testimonials	  he	  presented	  when	  applying	  for	  the	  Chair	  at	  Edinburgh	  in	  1832/33.79	  “Spirit”,	  Forbes	  claimed,	  was	  far	  more	  important	  than	  the	  processes	  of	  science:	  “it	  is	  not	  our	  business	  here	  to	  dwell	  upon	  mere	  labours	  of	  precision,	  …	  but	  to	  show	  the	  spirit	  in	  which	  these	  labours	  must	  be	  undertaken”	  (p847,	  Forbes’	  emphasis).	  Thus	  an	  elitism	  of	  spirit	  divided	  the	  great	  man	  of	  science,	  including	  himself,	  from	  mere	  labourers.80	  His	  Dissertation	  exemplifies	  a	  nineteenth	  century	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concern	  with	  spirit	  and	  morals	  that	  cuts	  across	  questions	  about	  discipline	  and	  field.	  Although	  defining	  physical	  science	  in	  these	  terms	  appears	  to	  fly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  later	  institutional	  definitions	  of	  the	  discipline,	  Phillips	  has	  shown	  that	  local	  societies	  in	  Germany	  acted	  as	  sites	  of	  collective	  action	  through	  which	  similar	  ideals	  developed	  among	  cultivators	  of	  natural	  science.81	  Forbes	  owed	  his	  own	  early	  career	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  his	  family	  networking	  in	  the	  RSE	  and	  his	  central	  role	  in	  the	  nascent	  BAAS,	  and	  we	  may	  see	  his	  definition	  of	  the	  physical	  sciences	  as	  socially	  rooted	  in	  associational	  ideals	  rather	  than	  in	  brick-­‐and-­‐mortar	  institutions.82	  	  This	  was	  an	  account	  of	  “philosophers”	  as	  much	  as	  of	  physics.	  Forbes	  aimed	  to	  impress,	  “upon	  the	  reader…	  the	  leading	  facts	  and	  features	  of	  discovery	  in	  every	  age,	  together	  with	  the	  intellectual	  characteristics	  of	  the	  greatest	  minds	  which	  contributed	  to	  it”	  (p801).	  	  Like	  Brewster	  before	  him,	  he	  resolved	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  focus	  on	  individuals	  and	  the	  increasing	  community	  emphasis	  on	  shared	  norms	  and	  values,	  by	  contending	  that	  philosophers	  were	  clearly	  distinguished	  by	  their	  moral	  qualities.83	  The	  most	  frequent	  of	  these	  was	  perseverance.	  Thus	  Fox	  Talbot,	  the	  photographer,	  was,	  “a	  Wiltshire	  gentleman	  of	  great	  ingenuity	  and	  perseverance…”	  (p923);	  the	  engineer,	  George	  Stephenson,	  was,	  “a	  man	  perhaps	  of	  less	  genius	  [than	  Richard	  Trevithick}	  but	  of	  greater	  sagacity	  and	  perseverance”	  (p883);	  of	  astronomer	  Francis	  Baily,	  “No	  amount	  of	  contrariety	  and	  failure	  …	  was	  ever	  known	  to	  ruffle	  his	  temper,	  or	  to	  make	  his	  perseverance	  falter”	  (p852).	  Perseverance	  was	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  British;	  the	  German	  Bessel,	  Italian	  Galvani,	  and	  French	  Regnault	  also	  evinced	  it.	  But	  physics	  was	  not	  purely	  a	  handle-­‐turning	  process	  in	  which	  perseverance	  was	  enough.	  Sagacity,	  ingenuity,	  originality,	  and	  genius,	  were	  also	  required	  for	  scientific	  discovery.	  	  	  That	  the	  developments	  he	  described	  should	  have	  the	  status	  of	  enduring	  discoveries	  was	  an	  underlying	  principle.	  But	  there	  was	  a	  tension,	  which	  he	  recognised,	  between	  the	  discovery-­‐based	  historiography	  that	  Whewell	  had	  promoted,	  and	  Forbes’	  own	  prioritisation	  of	  intellectual	  spirit.	  The	  faults	  of	  discoverers	  who	  fell	  short	  of	  the	  highest	  moral	  standards	  could	  be	  glossed	  over.	  More	  problematic	  was	  the	  inclusion	  of	  pre-­‐eminent	  philosophers	  who	  had	  not	  made	  any	  significant	  discovery.	  The	  former	  Edinburgh	  Professor	  of	  Natural	  Philosophy,	  John	  Robison,	  was	  one	  such.	  “The	  name	  of	  Robison	  may	  perhaps	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  identified	  with	  any	  great	  discovery	  to	  merit	  a	  place”	  (p870),	  started	  Forbes,	  before	  expending	  600	  words	  arguing	  for	  his	  inclusion.	  Forbes	  made	  his	  case	  primarily	  on	  Robison’s	  contributions	  as	  a	  critic	  and	  author	  –	  known	  especially	  for	  his	  articles	  on	  “steam”	  and	  “steam	  engine”	  in	  the	  third	  edition	  of	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  -­‐	  establishing	  first	  his	  moral	  claims	  (generous,	  patient,	  conscientious,	  laborious	  energy),	  and	  then	  his	  intellectual,	  “He	  was	  also	  a	  philosopher	  in	  a	  high	  sense	  of	  the	  word”	  (p870).	  He	  was,	  argued	  Forbes,	  “Eminently	  useful	  in	  forwarding	  the	  march	  of	  science	  …	  a	  few	  more	  such	  authors	  …	  would	  be	  cheaply	  purchased	  by	  the	  postponement	  of	  some	  second-­‐rate	  discoveries…”	  (p871).	  For	  Forbes,	  the	  right	  intellectual	  spirit,	  and	  sound	  judgement	  in	  selecting	  the	  signal	  from	  the	  increasing	  noise	  of	  second-­‐rate	  science,	  trumped	  discovery.	  	  Forbes’	  portrayal	  is	  coherent	  with	  the	  image	  of	  men	  of	  science	  conveyed	  by	  the	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leaders	  of	  the	  BAAS,	  of	  whom	  he	  was	  one:	  non-­‐sectarian,	  non-­‐political,	  intellectual	  as	  well	  as	  moral,	  whose	  aim	  was	  to	  “consolidate	  the	  role	  of	  science	  as	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  cognition	  of	  industrial	  society”.84	  Elitism,	  enforced	  by	  selection	  was	  crucial	  in	  creating	  this	  image.	  This	  was	  an	  elitism	  of	  the	  intellect,	  rather	  than	  of	  class	  or,	  ostensibly,	  of	  wealth.	  A	  comparison	  of	  Forbes’	  accounts	  of	  Lord	  Rosse,	  creator	  of	  the	  largest	  telescope	  in	  the	  world	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  James	  Watt,	  drives	  this	  point	  home.85	  Both	  had	  to	  be	  shown	  to	  have	  earned	  their	  inclusion:	  “…neither	  rank	  nor	  wealth	  could	  absolve	  Lord	  Rosse	  from	  those	  toils	  and	  disappointments	  which	  attend	  all	  new	  and	  original	  efforts....	  [He]	  owes	  his	  success	  entirely	  to	  his	  unwearying	  perseverance	  and	  mechanical	  skill”	  (p863).	  Conversely,	  Watt,	  “…by	  education	  and	  habit	  strictly	  a	  mechanic,	  he	  had	  the	  peculiar	  merit	  of	  apprehending	  the	  value	  of	  theory,”	  and,	  “taught	  men	  to	  raise	  the	  useful	  arts	  to	  a	  new	  dignity	  …	  to	  render	  the	  labours	  of	  the	  workshop	  subservient	  to	  intellectual	  progress”	  (p865).	  But,	  as	  implied	  by	  his	  frequent	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “genius”	  it	  was	  an	  elitism	  of	  birth	  –	  of	  nature.	  “Rules	  are	  of	  use	  in	  the	  humbler	  and	  more	  mechanical	  grade	  of	  subjects,	  but	  utterly	  unavailing	  in	  the	  highest.	  Nature	  herself	  creates	  discoverers”.86	  Forbes	  spread	  the	  term	  genius	  more	  widely	  than	  did	  Whewell,	  and	  claimed	  no	  theory-­‐experiment	  hierarchy,	  equally	  likely	  to	  attribute	  genius	  to	  either.87	  The	  image	  he	  conveyed	  aligned	  with	  the	  Scottish	  myth	  of	  the	  socially	  open	  “democratic	  intellect”,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  the	  BAAS.88	  	  	  The	  distinction	  he	  drew	  between	  science	  conducted	  by	  rule,	  and	  that	  by	  intellectually	  elite	  discoverers	  may	  map	  to	  that	  Levitt	  draws	  between	  two	  forms	  of	  sociability,	  one	  that	  refers	  to	  authoritarian	  rules	  to	  guarantee	  its	  meaning,	  the	  other	  predicated	  on	  rational	  debate	  between	  equals	  without	  centralized	  authority.89	  Once	  again,	  Forbes	  was	  promoting	  associational	  culture	  as	  the	  socio-­‐institutional	  basis	  for	  discovery,	  assuming	  the	  pre-­‐condition	  of	  a	  rational	  intellectual	  elite	  could	  be	  met.	  However,	  he	  was	  beginning	  to	  doubt	  whether	  it	  could.	  	  In	  recent	  times,	  “the	  labourers	  are	  more	  numerous”	  and	  all	  were	  scrambling,	  “for	  a	  share	  in	  the	  applause	  which	  arises	  out	  of	  some	  real	  though	  perhaps	  not	  very	  important	  observation.”	  90	  	  There	  were	  few	  capable	  -­‐	  as	  he	  clearly	  believed	  himself	  to	  be	  -­‐	  to	  judge	  their	  claims.	  Thus,	  Forbes	  evinced	  unease	  that	  associational	  culture	  was	  ceasing	  to	  engender	  the	  right	  spirit.	  Fifteen	  years	  previously	  he	  had	  noted	  to	  Whewell	  his	  experience	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  “humbug”	  in	  German	  scientific	  society,	  and	  now	  Britain	  was	  following	  the	  same	  path.91	  Publication	  in	  society	  transactions	  was	  becoming	  all	  too	  easy.	  “Societies	  and	  academies…	  are	  now	  more	  numerous	  but	  of	  less	  certain	  utility.	  There	  is	  a	  danger	  lest	  they	  become	  exhibition-­‐theatres	  for	  persons	  of	  an	  inferior	  stamp....”92	  The	  line	  Forbes	  drew	  here	  between	  the	  practices	  of	  true	  “philosophers”	  and	  the	  culture	  of	  display	  of	  inferior	  science	  became	  characteristic	  of	  the	  North	  British	  physicists	  of	  the	  next	  generation,	  discussed	  by	  Morus,	  and	  Mitchell;	  Forbes’	  own	  careful	  classroom	  demonstration	  using	  his	  world	  class	  apparatus	  was	  a	  component	  of	  good	  teaching,	  but	  public	  sensational	  display	  was	  unacceptable.93	  	  But	  despite	  Forbes’	  efforts,	  as	  a	  reforming	  professor,	  to	  provide	  physical	  and	  technical	  education,	  there	  is	  no	  suggestion	  in	  the	  Dissertation	  that	  he	  saw	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  inferior	  science	  in	  institutionalized	  training.	  His	  account	  of	  Watt’s	  informal	  education	  is	  illuminating.	  Watt	  may,	  or	  may	  not,	  have	  attended	  the	  chemist,	  Joseph	  Black’s,	  lectures	  at	  Glasgow,	  but	  through	  his,	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“intelligent	  spirit,”	  he	  gained,	  “advantages	  …	  which	  nineteen-­‐twentieths	  of	  enrolled	  students	  never	  attain….	  Whilst	  the	  laboratories	  of	  the	  classes	  of	  Chemistry	  and	  Natural	  Philosophy	  must	  have	  been	  his	  familiar	  resort,	  his	  own	  rooms	  were	  frequented	  by	  the	  most	  intelligent	  students,	  …	  where	  subjects	  of	  science	  …	  were	  diligently	  canvassed”	  (pp866-­‐7).94	  Watt’s	  natural	  personal	  merit	  gained	  him	  the	  associations	  needed	  to	  succeed	  in	  physical	  science,	  and	  these	  were	  more	  important	  than	  the	  rules	  provided	  by	  formal	  education.	  	  	  Forbes	  deemed	  education	  and	  perseverance	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  to	  produce	  the	  second-­‐rate	  men	  whose	  labours	  were	  essential	  for	  producing	  new	  facts	  or	  working	  out	  the	  consequences	  of	  new	  laws.	  But	  education	  could	  not	  produce	  the	  first-­‐rate	  geniuses	  who	  progressed	  and	  defined	  physical	  science.95	  This	  circumvented	  the	  danger	  that	  Forbes	  and	  Whewell	  foresaw,	  that	  freely	  disseminating	  the	  rules	  of	  induction	  promulgated	  the	  notion	  that	  anybody	  could	  follow	  them	  and	  make	  discoveries.96	  Although	  associational	  culture	  might	  engender	  a	  proper	  spirit,	  nature	  also	  played	  a	  necessary	  part	  in	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  lack	  of	  centralised	  authority.	  While	  appealing	  to	  the	  reading	  tastes	  of	  the	  educated	  public,	  Forbes	  defined	  physical	  science	  not	  by	  their	  labours,	  but	  by	  the	  “great	  men	  who	  impressed	  the	  stamp	  of	  their	  genius	  at	  once	  on	  their	  age	  &	  on	  the	  Sciences	  which	  they	  [authored]”.97	  	  
	  
	  
The	  progress	  of	  physical	  science	  	  Leaving	  now	  Forbes’	  picture	  of	  physical	  science	  as	  progressed	  and	  curated	  by	  great	  men	  through	  an	  associational	  culture,	  and	  turning	  to	  the	  body	  of	  physical	  knowledge	  itself,	  two	  broad	  features	  stand	  out.	  The	  first	  is	  his	  refusal	  to	  demarcate	  physics	  from	  mathematics	  and	  the	  mechanical	  arts,	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  the	  progress	  of	  science	  was,	  probably,	  periodic.	  He	  deliberately	  articulated	  and	  argued	  the	  first	  in	  the	  Dissertation.	  The	  second	  is	  an	  inference	  from	  his	  comments	  in	  the	  Dissertation,	  and	  his	  1858	  article,	  “History	  of	  Science	  and	  Some	  of	  its	  Lessons”.	  Forbes	  viewed	  science	  as	  progressed	  by	  “cautious	  induction”	  through	  the	  insights	  of	  natural	  geniuses.	  However,	  the	  fruits	  of	  induction	  might	  be	  exhausted	  before	  perfect	  theories	  were	  reached;	  a	  new	  way	  might	  have	  to	  be	  found,	  perhaps	  through	  the	  mechanical	  arts.	  	  In	  1858	  Forbes	  commended	  the	  “uncompromising	  lesson	  of	  cautious	  induction	  which	  Newton…	  taught.”98	  His	  brand	  of	  induction,	  which	  allowed	  analogy,	  and	  hypothesis	  provided	  it	  could	  be	  matched	  by	  experiment,	  but	  rejected	  Whewell’s	  emphasis	  on	  a	  priori	  knowledge,	  has	  been	  discussed	  by	  Olson,	  Wilson,	  and	  Yeo.	  All	  three	  place	  Forbes	  in	  the	  Scottish	  tradition	  of	  Playfair	  and	  Stewart	  and	  distinguish	  his	  views	  from	  those	  of	  Whewell.99	  	  	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Dissertation,	  Forbes	  surveyed	  briefly	  how	  the	  components	  of	  	  “cautious	  induction”	  had	  been	  put	  in	  place	  over	  the	  previous	  four	  centuries.	  A	  preliminary	  phase	  (1450-­‐1550)	  saw	  the	  development	  of	  algebra,	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  the	  application	  of	  mathematics	  that	  was	  to	  follow.	  The	  next	  century	  was	  characterised	  by	  the	  triumph	  of	  observation	  and	  experiment	  over	  dogma.	  The	  century	  1650-­‐1750	  demonstrated	  triumphantly	  the	  successful	  application	  of	  
Falconer:	  “Phases	  of	  Physics	  in	  J.D.	  Forbes…,”	  in	  History	  of	  Science	  	  	  
	  
p14	  
mathematics	  to	  accumulated	  observations	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Newton.	  Finally,	  the	  period	  1750-­‐1850,	  with	  which	  his	  Dissertation	  was	  concerned,	  had	  seen	  the	  great	  expansion	  of	  experiment,	  enabling	  the	  methods	  of	  inductive,	  mathematically	  based,	  science	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  far	  wider	  range	  of	  phenomena	  than	  ever	  before,	  but	  also	  supplying	  a	  necessary	  check	  on	  unbridled	  mathematical	  abstraction.	  	  The	  basic	  epistemological	  characteristic	  of	  physical	  sciences,	  for	  Forbes,	  was	  that	  they	  sought	  efficient	  causal	  explanations.	  In	  both	  the	  Dissertation,	  and	  his	  teaching,	  he	  described	  an	  inductive	  ascent	  from	  carefully	  measured	  observations	  or	  “facts”,	  to	  highly	  quantitative	  laws	  such	  as	  Kepler’s	  that	  related	  the	  facts	  mathematically,	  to	  causal	  theories.	  The	  theories	  always	  had	  to	  be	  anchored	  and	  kept	  in	  check	  by	  the	  facts.	  Pursuing	  his	  scheme,	  early	  notes	  for	  the	  Dissertation	  tabulated,	  “the	  periods	  1650	  1750	  1850	  in	  respect	  of,	  I	  Great	  Theories,	  II	  General	  Laws,	  III	  Important	  Facts”.	  This	  schematic	  was	  superficially	  similar	  to	  Whewell’s,	  but	  it	  lacked	  the	  “fundamental	  ideas”	  that	  were	  central	  to	  Whewell’s	  philosophy.	  Whewell	  had	  developed	  further	  Kant’s	  notion	  of	  a	  priori	  categories:	  	  fundamental	  ideas	  such	  as	  space	  and	  time	  were	  supplied	  by	  the	  mind	  itself,	  but	  were	  latent	  until	  “unfolded”	  through	  empirical	  experience.	  Conversely,	  they	  provided	  the	  organising	  principles	  for	  experience.	  Each	  science	  had	  a	  unique	  fundamental	  idea	  to	  organise	  its	  facts;	  for	  example	  space	  was	  the	  fundamental	  idea	  of	  geometry,	  and	  cause	  that	  of	  mechanics.	  Whewell	  suggested	  that	  the	  first	  law	  of	  motion	  was	  knowable	  a	  priori	  once	  the	  idea	  of	  cause,	  in	  the	  special	  form	  that	  applied	  to	  motion,	  i.e.	  force,	  was	  unfolded.	  This	  was	  a	  sticking	  point	  that	  Forbes	  could	  not	  accept	  and	  which	  marked	  his	  divergence	  from	  Whewell	  over	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  priori	  knowledge.100	  	  	  	  Forbes’	  table	  showed	  different	  branches	  of	  the	  physical	  sciences	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  progress.	  By	  1850,	  mechanics	  and	  physical	  astronomy	  had	  their	  “Great	  Theory”	  of	  gravity,	  as	  had	  optics	  in	  the	  undulatory	  theory	  of	  light.	  But	  heat	  had	  not	  yet	  achieved	  a	  “Great	  Theory”,	  though	  it	  did	  have	  “General	  Laws”	  of	  specific	  and	  latent	  heat,	  confirmation	  that,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  Forbes	  did	  not	  recognise	  the	  Thomson’s	  unification	  based	  on	  energy.	  Acoustics	  was	  still	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  “Important	  Facts”.	  Conversely,	  electricity	  and	  magnetism	  had	  theories	  (plural	  but	  unspecified)	  in	  the	  “Great	  Theories”	  column.	  	  	  Forbes	  used	  the	  stages	  as	  explanatory	  factors	  for	  the	  pace	  of	  progress.	  A	  move	  from	  one	  stage	  to	  the	  next	  signalled	  a	  burst	  of	  discoveries.	  Progress	  then	  slowed,	  as	  it	  became	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  find	  anything	  new	  or	  meaningful,	  until	  fresh	  insight	  moved	  the	  science	  on	  to	  the	  next	  stage.	  Such	  insights	  were	  attained	  only	  by	  men	  endowed	  with	  natural	  genius.	  By	  1850,	  Forbes	  judged,	  many	  branches	  of	  physical	  science	  were	  suffering	  inevitable	  decline	  following,	  “…	  the	  vast	  steps	  so	  recently	  made	  in	  Optics,	  in	  Electricity,	  in	  Magnetism,	  in	  Thermotics,101	  and	  in	  Chemical	  principles,	  [which]	  tended	  of	  necessity	  to	  call	  forth	  such	  an	  amount	  of	  laborious	  detail	  …	  as	  seemed	  to	  render	  fresh	  and	  striking	  originality	  somewhat	  hopeless…”(p801).	  At	  this	  juncture,	  he	  might	  have	  called	  for	  greater	  direction	  of	  science,	  through	  university	  institutions,	  to	  manage	  progress.	  That	  he	  did	  not,	  shows	  how	  little	  he	  considered	  such	  institutions	  as	  the	  central	  drivers	  of	  science.	  Among	  the	  institutions	  he	  mentioned	  in	  passing	  were	  universities,	  observatories,	  laboratories	  (but	  only	  the	  Royal	  Institution,	  and	  Dr	  Beddoes’),102	  and	  scientific	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societies,	  but	  only	  observatories	  provided	  any	  resource	  beyond	  individual	  salaries.	  	  	  Where	  Forbes	  looked,	  for	  the	  onward	  progress	  of	  physics,	  was	  commercial	  engineering:	  Prompted,	  perhaps,	  by	  the	  success	  of	  the	  BAAS	  in	  persuading	  marine	  engineers	  and	  naval	  architects	  to	  report	  their	  data	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  materials	  for	  use	  by	  men	  of	  science,103	  Forbes	  held	  that,	  “We	  are	  continually	  performing	  experiments	  on	  a	  great	  scale	  and	  on	  purely	  commercial	  principles,	  which	  no	  individual	  philosopher	  or	  merely	  scientific	  society	  could	  have	  ventured	  to	  attempt”	  (p809).	  University	  institutions	  played	  no	  more	  role	  in	  this	  account	  of	  the	  progress	  of	  physics,	  than	  they	  did	  in	  the	  education	  of	  “philosophers”	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  Progress	  became	  particularly	  difficult	  once	  the	  third	  stage,	  Theories,	  had	  bedded	  in.	  This	  was	  already	  true	  of	  astronomy.	  “The	  more	  that	  any	  theory	  of	  a	  mathematical	  kind,	  like	  that	  of	  Gravitation,	  advances	  to	  perfection...	  the	  more	  intense	  and	  continuous	  is	  the	  labour	  …	  necessary	  to	  make	  any	  advance	  at	  all”	  (p824).	  Overall,	  he	  believed	  that	  science	  still	  had	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go.	  “We	  have	  as	  yet	  made	  but	  an	  insignificant	  advance	  towards	  that	  completer	  system	  of	  Natural	  Philosophy	  of	  which	  Newton’s	  will	  form	  but	  one	  section”	  (p809).	  Again,	  there	  is	  no	  hint	  of	  greater	  unification	  being	  sought,	  or	  that	  the	  completer	  system	  would	  be	  more	  than	  an	  aggregation	  of	  sections	  such	  as	  Newton’s.	  	  	  At	  this	  third	  stage	  Forbes	  took	  issue	  with	  Whewell’s	  optimistic	  belief	  in	  the	  power	  of	  his	  version	  of	  induction.104	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  although	  Bacon	  had	  shown	  a	  way	  to	  surmount	  the	  errors	  of	  dogma	  that	  had	  stultified	  the	  medieval	  period,	  this	  did	  not	  logically	  guarantee	  indefinite	  progress.	  Inductive	  progress	  might	  be	  limited	  by	  another,	  not	  yet	  conceived,	  intellectual	  error.	  	  	  All	  was	  not	  necessarily	  lost,	  though.	  In	  1858,	  Forbes	  employed	  two	  metaphors	  for	  the	  progress	  of	  science,	  of	  daybreak	  to	  noon,	  and	  of	  spring	  to	  summer.	  He	  intertwined	  the	  two	  by	  adopting	  the	  position	  of	  an	  Arctic	  navigator.	  Physical	  science	  was	  currently	  approaching	  harvest	  –	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  induction.	  “The	  glorious	  sun	  cannot	  rise	  higher	  than	  it	  is	  at	  the	  Tropic	  …	  The	  burden	  and	  heat	  of	  the	  day	  falls	  on	  the	  labourers….”105	  He	  took	  the	  process	  no	  further,	  but	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  both	  metaphors	  were	  periodic.	  Induction	  might	  prove	  limited,	  leading	  no	  further	  than	  the	  current	  laborious	  harvest,	  with	  unimagined	  errors	  preventing	  further	  progress,	  but	  a	  new	  way	  forward	  would	  be	  found	  and	  spring	  or	  daybreak	  and	  a	  new	  burst	  of	  progress	  would,	  in	  the	  end,	  come	  again.106	  The	  implication	  was	  clear,	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  Forbes,	  who	  was	  well	  known	  for	  his	  enthusiasm	  for	  engineering,	  saw	  alliance	  with	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  as	  one	  such	  way	  forward.	  
	  
	  
The	  mathematics	  -­‐	  physical	  science	  –	  mechanical	  arts	  
triumvirate	  	  Although	  he	  was	  not	  new	  in	  arguing	  for	  a	  close	  relation	  between	  physical	  science	  and	  engineering,	  Forbes	  was	  relatively	  unusual	  in	  assigning	  them	  equal	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intellectual	  value	  and	  including	  engineering	  within	  the	  field	  of	  “physical	  sciences”.	  One	  of	  the	  barriers	  to	  progress	  that	  he	  continually	  cautioned	  against	  was	  inappropriate	  relations	  between	  mathematics,	  experiment,	  and	  physical	  science.	  Lack	  of	  experiment	  had	  held	  science	  back	  before	  the	  sixteenth	  century,	  and	  a	  too-­‐abstract	  mathematics	  in	  the	  eighteenth.	  “But	  as	  [physical]	  knowledge	  advances	  it	  extends	  in	  both	  directions	  towards	  speculation	  [i.e.	  mathematics]	  and	  towards	  practical	  applications,	  but	  most	  towards	  the	  applications”	  (p805).	  	  	  By	  1750-­‐1850,	  physical	  science	  had	  arrived	  at	  a	  point	  where	  it	  was	  distinguished	  by	  drawing,	  “far	  more	  largely	  upon	  Experiment	  as	  a	  means	  of	  arriving	  at	  truth	  than	  had	  previously	  been	  done….	  science	  and	  art	  have	  been	  more	  indissolubly	  united	  than	  at	  any	  previous	  period”	  (p799).	  Here,	  and	  in	  the	  epigraph,	  Forbes	  made	  two	  claims	  that	  he	  clearly	  expected	  to	  be	  contested:	  that	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  was	  worth	  considering;	  and	  that	  the	  relationships	  were	  reciprocal.	  In	  some	  sense	  the	  early	  BAAS	  had	  already	  promulgated	  this	  argument	  when	  they	  established	  Section	  G	  (mechanical	  science).	  It	  was	  seen,	  too,	  in	  Airy’s	  fascination	  with	  engineering	  or	  Whewell’s	  claims	  from	  the	  1830s	  on	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  practical	  art	  and	  science.	  107	  But	  Forbes	  took	  a	  particular	  line.	  Where	  these	  precursors	  insisted	  on	  the	  subservience	  of	  practical	  to	  theoretical	  science,	  signified	  by	  the	  term	  “mechanical	  science”	  for	  Section	  G,	  and	  denied	  the	  intellectual	  interest	  of	  its	  applications,	  Forbes	  referred	  throughout	  to	  “mechanical	  arts”	  asserting	  a	  more	  equal	  status,	  and	  the	  interest	  of	  applications.	  He	  implicitly	  also	  asserted	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  physical	  sciences	  included	  the	  field	  of	  engineering	  –	  warding	  off	  the	  threat	  to	  his	  own	  income	  from	  student	  fees	  posed	  by	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  new	  Chair	  of	  Technology	  at	  Edinburgh.108	  Thus	  his	  argument	  was	  inclusive.	  It	  contrasts	  with	  that	  of	  his	  former	  student	  Rankine,	  who,	  as	  newly	  appointed	  Regius	  Professor	  of	  Civil	  Engineering	  and	  Mechanics	  at	  Glasgow,	  sought	  an	  academic	  institutional	  space	  between	  science	  and	  practice	  in	  his	  addresses	  on	  “harmony	  of	  theory	  and	  practice”.109	  	  Forbes	  argued	  that	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  were	  experiment	  on	  a	  great	  scale,	  undertaken	  in	  a	  spirit	  of	  grand	  endeavour.	  Civil	  engineering	  was	  experiment	  because	  no	  physical	  theory	  yet	  encompassed	  all	  the	  real-­‐world	  factors	  that	  had	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  In	  a	  passage	  that	  cleverly	  placed	  Watt	  and	  Stephenson	  alongside	  the	  undoubted	  discoverer,	  Galileo,	  he	  argued:	  We	  can	  all	  readily	  imagine	  the	  throb	  of	  anxiety	  with	  which	  Galileo	  pointed	  his	  glasses	  for	  the	  first	  time	  to	  the	  moon	  –	  with	  which	  Watt	  saw	  the	  cylinder	  of	  his	  model	  exhausted,	  and	  the	  piston	  descend	  under	  the	  action	  of	  his	  separate	  condenser	  –	  and	  Stephenson,	  the	  stupendous	  iron	  tube	  at	  Conway	  resting	  for	  the	  first	  time	  straight	  as	  a	  ramrod	  on	  its	  two	  piers	  –	  these	  are	  moments	  of	  anxiety	  and	  of	  triumph,	  which	  place	  the	  inventor	  of	  a	  machine	  and	  the	  architect	  of	  a	  structure	  on	  a	  par	  with	  the	  discoverer	  of	  a	  planet,	  or	  with	  the	  author	  of	  a	  theory	  (p808).	  	  Viewed	  as	  experiment,	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  were	  at	  once	  limited,	  but	  also	  essential	  to	  progress.	  Since,	  “It	  is	  not	  given	  to	  man	  to	  endue	  matter	  with	  new	  properties”	  (p808-­‐9),	  technology	  forestalled	  the	  otherwise	  inevitable	  slowdown	  of	  inductive	  ascent	  by	  placing	  nature	  under	  new	  conditions,	  thus	  generating	  new	  facts.	  As	  highligted	  by	  Marsden	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Rankine,	  these	  experiments	  took	  place	  not	  in	  an	  institutional	  laboratory,	  but	  outside,	  in	  the	  commercial	  world.110	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  Less	  usual,	  was	  Forbes’	  claim	  that	  invention	  was	  as	  truly	  intellectual	  as	  pure	  physics.	  “The	  masterpieces	  of	  civil	  engineering…	  are	  not	  to	  be	  compassed	  without	  inductive	  skill	  as	  remarkable	  and	  as	  truly	  philosophic	  as	  any	  effort	  which	  the	  man	  of	  science	  exerts…”	  (p801).	  The	  phrase	  “truly	  philosophic”,	  signifying	  valid	  knowledge	  construction,	  countered	  Whewell’s	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  science	  and	  art	  –	  though	  having	  made	  this	  distinction	  Whewell	  did	  concern	  himself	  in	  the	  “science”	  of	  engineering,	  for	  example	  in	  his	  book	  
Mechanics	  of	  Engineering	  (1841).111	  Invention,	  suggested	  Forbes,	  was	  more	  intellectually	  challenging	  and	  worthy	  of	  counting	  as	  science:	  “It	  is	  not	  to	  be	  imagined	  that	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  problems	  which	  occupy	  the	  speculative	  philosopher,	  or	  the	  comprehensiveness	  of	  mind	  required	  for	  their	  solution,	  diminishes	  in	  any	  degree	  as	  we	  descend	  from	  the	  regions	  of	  pure	  science	  to	  the	  walks	  of	  everyday	  life	  ...	  In	  fact,	  the	  former	  are	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  simpler	  investigations….”(p809,	  Forbes’	  emphasis).	  	  	  To	  clinch	  this	  argument,	  Forbes	  again	  employed	  a	  principle	  of	  selecting	  the	  elite.	  He	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  all	  mechanics	  counted	  equal	  to	  a	  man	  of	  science.	  Novelty	  and	  innovation	  were	  essential	  as	  “…	  such	  praise	  is	  only	  applicable	  when	  the	  invention	  is	  such	  as	  to	  call	  forth	  the	  qualities	  which	  distinguish	  the	  Philosopher.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  mere	  command	  over	  the	  agents	  of	  nature	  which	  challenges	  our	  admiration,112	  it	  is	  the	  foresight,	  the	  patience,	  the	  conceptive	  faculty,	  the	  clear-­‐sighted	  and	  confident	  anticipations	  of	  what	  will	  be	  the	  results	  of	  natural	  laws	  acting	  in	  given	  circumstances,	  these	  circumstances	  being	  in	  some	  essential	  particulars	  new”	  (p808,	  Forbes’	  emphasis).	  	  The	  second	  claim	  that	  Forbes	  argued	  strongly	  was	  the	  reciprocal	  relation	  between	  mathematics,	  physical	  science,	  and	  mechanical	  arts.	  Physics	  and	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  were	  intertwined	  intellectually	  as	  well	  as	  experimentally:	  “…	  it	  is	  quite	  impossible	  not	  to	  admit	  how	  large	  a	  share	  the	  sciences	  of	  application	  have	  had	  in	  …	  compelling	  [men]	  to	  realize	  certain	  abstract	  notions	  far	  from	  easy	  of	  conception”	  (p805).	  Elision	  between	  “physical”	  and	  “geometrical”	  enabled	  him	  to	  reject	  any	  primacy	  of	  mathematics	  over	  physics:	  “…	  with	  few	  exceptions,	  theorems	  of	  the	  greatest	  value	  and	  beauty	  have	  been	  more	  frequently	  discovered	  during	  the	  attempt	  to	  solve	  some	  physical	  or	  at	  least	  geometrical	  problem,	  than	  in	  comprehensive	  yet	  indefinite	  attempts	  to	  generalize	  the	  relations	  of	  abstract	  magnitude”	  (p806).	  	  For	  Forbes,	  who	  had	  little	  formal	  mathematical	  education,	  mathematics	  had	  no	  importance	  as	  knowledge	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  It	  had	  value	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  physics,	  and	  he	  was	  wary	  of	  abstractions,	  such	  as	  Poisson’s	  potential	  theory	  upon	  which	  unifying	  moves	  in	  heat	  were	  based,	  that	  took	  mathematics	  too	  far	  from	  bodily	  experience.	  Poisson,	  “allowed	  himself	  to	  be	  diverted	  …	  [by]	  constructing	  a	  system	  of	  Physics	  mainly	  founded	  on	  the	  applications	  of	  analysis….	  The	  author…	  shows	  himself	  as	  a	  profound	  analyst,	  but	  adds	  little	  to	  our	  knowledge	  either	  of	  principles	  or	  of	  important	  results”	  (p825).	  	  	  Forbes’	  views	  echoed	  those	  of	  Brewster	  and	  had	  their	  roots	  in	  the	  Scottish	  school	  of	  common	  sense	  philosophy	  of	  Dugald	  Stewart	  and	  Thomas	  Reid:	  mathematics	  was	  required	  to	  have	  its	  origins	  in	  sensory	  experience	  and	  its	  conclusions	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checked	  against	  physical	  reality.113	  So,	  although	  writing	  a	  dissertation	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  mathematical	  and	  physical	  sciences,	  Forbes	  avoided	  pure	  mathematics,	  unlike	  Playfair	  and	  Leslie.	  To	  his	  readers	  he	  explained	  that	  modern	  advances	  were	  too	  technical	  for	  a	  popular	  work.	  To	  Traill	  he	  added	  that,	  “They	  are	  also	  remarkably	  destitute	  of	  circumstances	  of	  personal	  or	  historical	  interest…”	  evidencing	  again	  his	  concern	  to	  woo	  a	  non-­‐scientific	  audience.114	  	  Forbes’	  account	  of	  the	  relations	  of	  mathematics,	  physics,	  and	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  direction	  being	  pushed	  by	  Whewell.	  He	  rejected	  Whewell’s	  belief	  in	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  and	  progress	  towards	  unity	  through	  increasing	  abstraction.	  Instead,	  he	  offered	  a	  way	  forward	  through	  practice	  and	  engineering	  that	  could	  guide	  science	  importantly.	  Where	  Whewell	  held	  that	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  did	  not	  justify	  the	  doing	  of	  inductive	  science,	  which	  should	  be	  done	  for	  its	  own	  intellectual	  interest,	  Forbes	  insisted	  that	  they	  had	  -­‐	  through	  forcing	  nature	  into	  new	  configurations	  and	  impelling	  men	  to	  new	  concepts.	  	  	  The	  Dissertation	  gave	  Forbes	  a	  platform	  to	  argue	  views	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  developed	  through	  his	  teaching	  experience.	  At	  Edinburgh	  he	  fought	  to	  maintain	  both	  mathematics	  and	  experimentation	  as	  part	  of	  the	  natural	  philosophy	  course,	  covering	  topics	  such	  as	  heat,	  electricity	  and	  magnetism,	  the	  principles	  of	  machines,	  the	  theory	  of	  steam	  engines.	  He	  vigorously	  defended	  his	  right	  to	  teach	  technological	  subjects,	  adding	  civil	  engineering	  to	  his	  course	  when	  proposals	  for	  a	  new	  professorship	  looked	  like	  encroaching	  on	  his	  preserves.	  A	  letter	  to	  his	  successor,	  Peter	  Guthrie	  Tait,	  gives	  a	  clue	  to	  his	  motivation:	  “I	  would	  …	  recommend	  …	  the	  extreme	  undesirableness	  of	  separating	  systematically	  the	  Mathematical	  and	  Experimental	  (or	  popular)	  departments	  of	  Nat.	  Philosophy.”115	  The	  experimental	  and	  technological	  aspects	  of	  his	  course	  were	  popular,	  brought	  in	  student	  fees,	  and	  met	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  developing	  Scottish	  industrial	  middle	  class.116	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  Forbes	  counted	  many	  of	  the	  latter	  among	  his	  network	  as	  he	  grew	  older,	  proposing	  several	  for	  fellowship	  of	  the	  RSE	  –	  though	  a	  degree	  of	  competitiveness	  developed	  as	  two	  of	  his	  protégés	  Lewis	  Gordon	  and	  Rankine	  succeeded	  successively	  to	  the	  Regius	  Chair	  of	  Civil	  Engineering	  and	  Mechanics	  at	  Glasgow;	  the	  inclusion	  of	  “Mechanics”	  in	  the	  Chair’s	  title	  trespassed	  on	  natural	  philosophy	  .117	  	  By	  insisting	  that	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  physical	  sciences,	  Forbes	  also,	  intentionally	  or	  not,	  countered	  the	  declinist	  views	  entertained	  by	  Herschel,	  Whewell,	  Brewster	  and	  others.118	  Earlier	  in	  his	  career	  he	  had	  put	  forward	  declinist	  arguments	  himself.	  But	  in	  the	  Dissertation	  his	  purpose	  was	  to	  enrol	  the	  public	  in	  a	  belief	  in	  scientific	  endeavour,	  rather	  than	  to	  argue	  support	  for	  its	  institutions.	  Although	  he	  devoted	  a	  couple	  of	  paragraphs	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  British	  mathematics	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  and	  its	  resurrection	  in	  Cambridge	  and	  Edinburgh	  in	  the	  nineteenth,	  this	  was	  limited	  to	  mathematics.	  The	  weight	  of	  the	  evidence	  (and	  the	  number	  of	  pages)	  presented	  to	  the	  reader	  describing	  the	  progress	  of	  physics	  allied	  to	  mechanical	  arts	  negated	  any	  suggestion	  of	  a	  wider	  decline:	  Britain	  clearly	  led	  other	  nations	  in	  the	  mechanical	  arts.	  Implicitly,	  not	  only	  had	  there	  been	  no	  significant	  decline,	  but	  the	  on-­‐going	  progress	  of	  physical	  science	  had	  its	  roots	  in	  practical	  applications	  and	  was	  independent	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Cambridge	  coterie.	  





Conclusion	  	  Writing	  in	  the	  1850s,	  Forbes’	  portrayal	  of	  physics	  was	  strongly	  grounded	  in	  his	  own	  experience,	  localised	  in	  Scotland	  but	  partaking	  in	  British	  and	  Europe-­‐wide	  communities.	  The	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  gave	  him	  a	  forum	  for	  shaping	  the	  shifting	  socio-­‐institutional	  and	  intellectual	  boundaries	  of	  physics	  in	  the	  mid	  nineteenth	  century	  while	  preserving	  his	  own	  position	  within	  them.	  Noticeable	  is	  Forbes’	  negotiation	  across	  boundaries	  of	  many	  different	  types:	  between	  physical	  sciences	  and	  other	  fields;	  between	  men	  of	  science	  and	  the	  educated	  public;	  between	  new	  and	  old	  philosophies	  and	  historiographies.	  The	  tensions	  and	  inconsistencies	  necessitated	  by	  such	  negotiations	  are	  everywhere	  apparent.	  They	  serve	  to	  locate	  the	  boundaries	  and	  demonstrate	  the	  complexity	  of	  discipline	  formation:	  discovery	  was	  becoming	  the	  accepted	  measure	  of	  scientific	  worth	  but	  could	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  reliable	  indicator;	  induction	  could	  not	  guarantee	  progress	  but	  abstract	  hypothesis	  was	  dangerous;	  too	  much	  communication	  was	  as	  bad	  for	  progress	  as	  too	  little;	  second-­‐rate	  men	  were	  needed	  to	  help	  with	  the	  laborious	  work	  and	  could	  be	  trained,	  but	  first-­‐rate	  geniuses	  had	  to	  be	  born;	  the	  public	  needed	  to	  be	  enrolled	  in	  support	  of	  science	  but	  associational	  culture	  was	  ceasing	  to	  foster	  intellectual	  spirit	  effectively;	  university	  institutions	  were	  no	  replacement	  for	  societies	  but	  he	  owed	  his	  own	  position	  to	  one.	  	  Despite	  his	  explicitly	  broad	  definition	  of	  the	  field	  of	  physical	  science,	  in	  practice	  Forbes	  drew	  the	  confines	  far	  more	  closely.	  De	  Morgan’s	  complaint	  that	  what	  he	  actually	  covered	  was,	  	  “mathematico-­‐physical	  science	  considered	  both	  mathematically	  and	  experimentally,”	  suggests	  that	  Forbes	  reflected	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  field	  of	  physics	  in	  a	  way	  with	  which	  educated	  British	  readers	  had	  not	  yet	  caught	  up.119	  However,	  the	  men	  of	  science	  who	  actively	  engaged	  with	  him	  in	  production	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  did	  not	  demur	  other	  than	  in	  small	  details;	  they	  seemed	  content	  with	  his	  portrayal	  –	  a	  portrayal	  that	  contrasts	  with	  the	  division	  between	  mathematics	  and	  experimental	  physics	  that	  had	  grown	  up	  in	  France	  following	  the	  decline	  of	  Laplacian	  physics.120	  	  But	  setting	  boundaries	  on	  physics,	  physical	  science,	  or	  physical	  institutions,	  was	  not	  Forbes’	  primary	  aim.	  Far	  more	  important	  was	  the	  attempt	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  public	  and	  win	  support	  by	  extolling	  physics’	  moral	  value	  –	  an	  attempt	  that	  was	  common	  across	  many	  scientific	  disciplines.	  Interestingly,	  he	  made	  no	  equivalent	  effort	  to	  gain	  extra	  support	  for	  pure	  physics	  as	  a	  guide	  and	  source	  for	  technology.	  Technology	  was	  included	  as	  a	  part	  of	  (moral)	  physical	  science,	  but	  physics	  gained	  prestige	  by	  being	  associated	  with	  it,	  not	  by	  leading	  it.	  	  The	  eighth	  edition	  of	  the	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  has	  been	  little	  studied,	  overshadowed	  as	  it	  soon	  became	  by	  the	  ninth,	  “scholars”	  edition,	  for	  which	  Maxwell	  took	  on	  the	  role	  of	  physical	  sciences	  editor.	  Like	  Forbes,	  this	  next	  generation	  of	  North	  British	  physicists,	  based	  mainly	  in	  university	  institutions,	  cultivated	  a	  broad	  learned	  public,	  using	  popular	  periodicals	  and	  books	  to	  pursue,	  particularly,	  their	  non-­‐materialist	  agenda.121	  The	  growing	  demand	  for	  technical	  education	  added	  teachers	  as	  an	  audience,	  whom	  they	  engaged	  through	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textbooks.	  But	  their	  attitudes	  to	  display,	  and	  the	  multiplication	  of	  societies	  that	  gave	  a	  voice	  to	  inferior	  men,	  were	  reminiscent	  of	  Forbes.122	  His	  Dissertation	  Sixth	  evidences	  modes	  of	  engagement	  and	  social	  cohesion	  between	  scientific	  men	  and	  the	  public,	  prevalent	  in	  the	  formative	  years	  of	  the	  North	  British	  group.	  	  	  	  Forbes,	  portrayed	  the	  field	  of	  physics	  as	  advanced	  by	  the	  elitist	  intellectual	  activity	  of	  great	  men,	  endowed	  with	  natural	  genius	  and	  demarcated	  by	  their	  high	  moral	  character,	  necessarily	  supported	  by	  the	  labours	  of	  an	  increasing	  multitude	  of	  un-­‐named	  second	  and	  third-­‐rate	  men.	  Physics	  as	  a	  discipline	  was	  curated	  by	  great	  men,	  within	  an	  associational	  culture	  that	  engendered	  true	  intellectual	  spirit.	  But	  although	  this	  societal	  mechanism	  was	  ceasing	  to	  provide	  effective	  curation,	  Forbes	  did	  not	  see	  university	  institutions	  as	  the	  way	  forward	  –	  possibly	  influenced	  by	  the	  lessons	  he	  drew	  from	  the	  German	  universities	  that	  produced	  too	  much	  “humbug”,	  and	  Cambridge	  where	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  mathematicians	  were	  driving	  an	  undesirable	  abstraction.	  Instead,	  he	  implied	  that	  a	  closer	  union	  with	  the	  mechanical	  arts	  might	  provide	  a	  way	  forward.	  The	  irony	  is	  that	  ultimately	  it	  did	  –	  though	  not	  in	  the	  way	  Forbes	  argued	  here	  -­‐	  as	  industrial	  needs	  drove	  the	  development	  of	  university	  physics	  departments	  in	  Britain.	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  Fyfe	  “Conscientious	  Workmen	  or	  Booksellers’	  Hacks?	  The	  Professional	  Identities	  of	  Science	  Writers	  in	  the	  Mid-­‐Nineteenth	  Century,”	  Isis,	  96	  (2005):	  192–223;	  Aileen	  Fyfe,	  Steam-­‐Powered	  Knowledge:	  William	  Chambers	  and	  the	  Business	  of	  
Publishing,	  1820-­‐1860	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2012);	  Steven	  Shapin	  “Brewster”,	  pp.17–23.	  	  61	  Vivienne	  Dunstan,	  Reading	  Habits	  in	  Scotland	  circa	  1750-­‐1820	  (Unpublished	  PhD	  thesis,	  University	  of	  Dundee,	  2010),	  esp.	  pp.90,	  95.	  	  62	  De	  Morgan	  and	  Dixon,	  “Review”	  p.1563.	  	  63	  StA-­‐FP,	  msdep	  7	  incoming	  letters	  1852/82,	  83(a,b)	  Forbes	  and	  Traill	  letters,	  13,	  16	  November	  1852.	  64	  Levitt,	  Shadow	  of	  Enlightenment,	  p.3.	  
Falconer:	  “Phases	  of	  Physics	  in	  J.D.	  Forbes…,”	  in	  History	  of	  Science	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  65	  Richard	  Yeo,	  Defining	  Science:	  William	  Whewell,	  natural	  knowledge	  and	  public	  
debate	  in	  early	  Victorian	  Britain	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  p.117.	  66	  Forbes	  to	  Traill,	  13	  November	  1852.	  67	  Simon	  Schaffer,	  “Scientific	  Discoveries	  and	  the	  End	  of	  Natural	  Philosophy,”	  
Social	  Studies	  of	  Science	  16	  (1986):	  387–420,	  esp.	  pp.411-­‐3.	  68	  Forbes	  used	  “physics”	  when	  qualified	  with	  an	  adjective,	  e.g.	  “mathematical	  physics”,	  “terrestrial	  physics”.	  He	  used	  “Natural	  Philosophy”	  when	  it	  was	  the	  proper	  title	  of	  institutional	  positions	  or	  treatises.	  Where	  he	  had	  free	  choice,	  he	  used	  “physics”	  more	  frequently	  than	  “natural	  philosophy”;	  he	  capitalized	  Natural	  Philosophy	  more	  often	  than	  Physics,	  but	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  any	  further	  rationale	  for	  when	  he	  used	  one	  or	  the	  other.	  69	  Caroline	  Herschel	  and	  Mary	  Somerville	  had	  brief	  mentions;	  neither	  rated	  a	  section	  heading,	  but	  both	  got	  index	  entries.	  Maria	  Agnesi’s	  Analytical	  Institutions	  was	  mentioned	  in	  a	  footnote,	  though	  only	  her	  family	  name	  was	  given,	  with	  no	  indication	  that	  she	  was	  female.	  	  70	  Listed	  in	  Wilson,	  “Educational	  Matrix,”	  p.22.	  71	  This	  section	  is	  the	  only	  hint	  that	  Forbes	  might	  see	  physics	  as	  close	  to	  chemistry	  –	  contrasting	  with	  Simon’s	  findings	  for	  France,	  see	  Simon	  
Communicating	  Physics,	  p.213.	  72	  Maxwell	  expressed	  an	  evolved	  version	  of	  this	  view	  twenty	  years	  later,	  when	  “mathematics”	  had	  been	  succeeded	  by	  “dynamics”.	  Physics	  occupied	  that	  space	  -­‐	  between	  “the	  abstract	  sciences	  of	  arithmetic,	  algebra	  and	  geometry”	  and	  chemistry	  -­‐	  for	  which	  “dynamics”	  provided	  a	  fundamental	  explanation.	  Although	  chemistry	  was	  expanding	  rapidly,	  dynamical	  explanations	  for	  some	  chemical	  phenomena	  were	  “reclaiming	  large	  tracts	  of	  good	  ground”	  for	  physics:	  James	  Clerk	  Maxwell,	  “Physical	  Sciences”	  in	  Vol.	  11	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica,	  9th	  ed.	  (Edinburgh:	  A&C	  Black,	  1885),	  pp.1-­‐3.	  	  	  73	  Wilson,	  “Educational	  Matrix,”	  p.32.	  74	  Crosbie	  Smith,	  The	  Science	  of	  Energy:	  A	  Cultural	  History	  of	  Energy	  Physics	  in	  
Victorian	  Britain	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998).	  75	  TCC-­‐WP	  Add.Ms.a/204/116,	  Forbes	  to	  Whewell,	  2	  Nov	  1856.	  76	  StA-­‐FP,	  msdep7	  incoming	  letters	  1856/94,	  Whewell	  to	  Forbes,	  23	  Oct	  1856.	  	  77	  Forbes	  to	  Whewell,	  2	  Nov	  1856.	  78	  TCC-­‐WP	  Add.Ms.a/204/121	  Forbes	  to	  Whewell,	  9	  Sept	  1857;	  StA-­‐FP	  msdep7	  incoming	  letters	  1857/79,	  Whewell	  to	  Forbes	  19	  Sept	  1857.	  79	  StA-­‐FP	  38079/35(i)	  Bound	  copy	  of	  Forbes’	  testimonials	  for	  the	  Edinburgh	  chair.	  	  80	  He	  clearly	  included	  himself	  among	  these	  “great	  men”;	  his	  discovery	  of	  the	  polarisation	  of	  radiant	  heat	  was	  included	  in	  his	  Dissertation	  (pp.956-­‐7).	  81	  Phillips,	  Acolytes,	  e.g.	  pp.9,	  135.	  	  
Falconer:	  “Phases	  of	  Physics	  in	  J.D.	  Forbes…,”	  in	  History	  of	  Science	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  82	  	  Forbes	  was	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  RSE.	  His	  grandfather	  was	  a	  founding	  fellow;	  his	  father,	  uncle,	  and	  two	  uncles	  by	  marriage	  (James	  Skene	  and	  Colin	  MacKenzie)	  were	  also	  fellows.	  Between	  them	  they	  served	  on	  Council,	  the	  Physical	  Council,	  as	  curator	  and	  librarian,	  and	  as	  Treasurer.	  Forbes’	  elder	  brothers	  John	  and	  Charles	  also	  became	  fellows,	  but	  subsequent	  to	  Forbes’	  election.	  Waterston	  and	  Shearer,	  Biographical	  Index.	  83	  D.	  Brewster,	  “Whewell”s	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Inductive	  Sciences,”	  Edinburgh	  
Review	  74	  (1842):	  265-­‐306,	  302.	  84	  Morrell	  and	  Thackray,	  Gentlemen	  of	  Science,	  p.32.	  85	  For	  Rosse	  see,	  for	  example,	  S.	  Schaffer	  “The	  Leviathan	  of	  Parsonstown:	  Literary	  technology	  and	  scientific	  representation,”	  in	  Lenoir	  (ed.),	  Inscribing	  
science,	  pp.182-­‐222.	  86	  Forbes,	  “History	  of	  Science,”	  p.292.	  87	  See	  Yeo,	  Defining	  Science,	  pp.121-­‐2	  for	  Whewell.	  	  88	  The	  reality	  of	  Davie’s	  Democratic	  Intellect	  in	  Scottish	  higher	  education	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  has	  been	  questioned	  by	  Robert	  Anderson	  among	  others.	  But	  none	  deny	  that	  it	  was	  a	  powerful	  myth.	  George	  E.	  Davie,	  The	  Democratic	  Intellect:	  
Scotland	  and	  Her	  Universities	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  1961);	  Anderson,	  Education	  and	  Opportunity.	  89	  Levitt,	  Shadow	  of	  Enlightenment,	  p.47.	  90	  Forbes,	  “History	  of	  Science,”	  pp.284-­‐5,	  293.	  91	  e.g.	  StA-­‐FP,	  msdep7	  Letterbook	  II	  pp467-­‐69,	  Forbes	  to	  Whewell,	  1	  November	  1837;	  Phillips,	  Acolytes,	  chapter	  4,	  discusses	  similar	  concerns	  in	  Germany.	  92	  Forbes,	  “History	  of	  Science,”	  p.293.	  	  93	  Iwan	  Rhys	  Morus,	  ,	  “What	  Happened	  to	  Scientific	  Sensation?”,	  European	  
Romantic	  Review	  22	  (2011):	  389–403;	  Mitchell,	  (this	  volume).	  94	  A	  referee	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  phrase	  “intelligent	  students”	  may	  be	  an	  oblique	  reference	  to	  Forbes’	  predecessor	  as	  Professor	  of	  Natural	  Philosophy,	  John	  Robison.	  95	  Forbes’	  views	  seem	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  his	  pupil,	  Maxwell,	  who,	  despite	  founding	  the	  archetypal	  British	  physics	  institution,	  the	  Cavendish	  Laboratory	  in	  Cambridge,	  practised	  a	  pedagogy	  based	  in	  apprenticeship	  and	  inspiration	  to	  self-­‐discipline;	  see	  Isobel	  Falconer	  “Building	  the	  Cavendish	  and	  time	  at	  Cambridge”	  in	  Raymond	  Flood,	  Mark	  McCartney	  and	  Andrew	  Whitaker	  (eds.),	  James	  Clerk	  Maxwell:	  Perspectives	  on	  his	  Life	  and	  Work	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  pp.67-­‐98.	  96	  Yeo,	  Defining	  Science,	  p.98;	  see	  also	  StA-­‐FP,	  msdep7	  incoming	  letters	  1855/40,	  Whewell	  to	  Forbes,	  10	  March	  1855.	  	  97	  Forbes	  to	  Traill,	  13	  November	  1852.	  98	  Forbes,	  “History	  of	  Science,”	  p.290.	  	  
Falconer:	  “Phases	  of	  Physics	  in	  J.D.	  Forbes…,”	  in	  History	  of	  Science	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  99	  Olson,	  Scottish	  Philosophy;	  Wilson,	  “The	  Educational	  Matrix”;	  Richard	  Yeo,	  “An	  Idol	  of	  the	  Market-­‐Place:	  Baconianism	  in	  Nineteenth	  Century	  Britain,”	  History	  of	  
Science	  23	  (1985):	  251–98.	  	  100	  StA-­‐FP,	  msdep7	  Scientific	  papers,	  Box	  27,	  nos.X/28;	  Wilson,	  “Educational	  Matrix”.	  101	  A	  term	  coined	  by	  William	  Whewell	  denoting	  that	  part	  of	  science	  that	  treats	  of	  heat	  (Oxford	  English	  Dictionary).	  102	  For	  an	  account	  of	  Dr	  Beddoes’s	  Laboratory	  see	  Frank	  AJL	  James,	  “The	  Subversive	  Humphry	  Davy:	  Aristocracy	  and	  Establishing	  Chemical	  Research	  Laboratories	  in	  Late	  Eighteenth-­‐	  and	  Early	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  England,”	  in	  Lissa	  Roberts	  and	  Simon	  Werrett	  (eds.)	  Compound	  Histories:	  Materials,	  
Governance	  and	  Production,	  1760-­‐1840	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2018).	  103	  Ben	  Marsden,	  “The	  administration	  of	  the	  “engineering	  science”	  of	  naval	  architecture	  at	  the	  British	  Association	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Science,	  1831–1872,”	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Administrative	  History	  20	  (2008):	  67–94.	  104	  Davie,	  Democratic	  Intellect,	  positions	  Forbes’	  argument	  as	  a	  move	  to	  curb	  the	  pressure	  for	  Anglicisation	  of	  Scottish	  universities.	  His	  conclusions	  about	  Anglicisation	  have	  been	  queried	  by	  Anderson,	  Education	  and	  Opportunity,	  pp358-­‐61,	  and	  J.	  B.	  Morrell,	  “Science	  and	  Scottish	  University	  Reform:	  Edinburgh	  in	  1826,”	  British	  Journal	  for	  the	  History	  of	  Science	  6	  (1972):	  39.	  	  105	  Forbes,	  “History	  of	  Science,”	  p.289.	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